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ARTICLE
CAPITAL RIGIDITIES, LATENT
EXTERNALITIES
Shi-Ling Hsu*
ABSTRACT
Capital, one of two fundamental inputs to production, is
critical to economic growth. As such, legal rules and institutions
generally seek to create more of it, and they also seek to protect
existing capital from policy changes. However, capital is often
durable, and during its natural life, information may emerge
pointing to negative externalities resulting from operation of that
capital. Legal rules and institutions, in seeking to stimulate and
sustain economic growth by promoting and protecting capital,
thus tend to induce the creation of excess capital. This
abundance of capital creates excess resistance to new regulation
or policy reform, as capital owners will have a larger capital
stake to defend and will expend more resources to resist changes
in their legal and economic environment.
This theory of capital has special application to
environmental externalities, which are commonly latent. Capital
is thus almost always obtained with incomplete information
about potential environmental externalities. Environmental law
is the means by which many previously unforeseen externalities
are sought to be addressed, but any change in environmental law
*
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is invariably challenged by capital owners. By enacting legal
rules to promote and protect capital, developed societies have
unwittingly erected larger barriers to environmental reform.
Over time, environmental law has become more difficult to
reform and the source of more litigation.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Capital is good. Capital and labor are the two stylized inputs
to production.1 Among economists, capital is universally regarded

1. The Cobb–Douglas production function, which every economics student
learns about in undergraduate economics, posits production as a function of the
quantity and productivity of just two types of inputs: labor and capital. See generally
Gerald Beer, The Cobb–Douglas Production Function, 53 MATHEMATICS MAG. 44, 44–
45 (1980) (describing how the function is commonly featured in economics and even
calculus texts); Charles W. Cobb & Paul H. Douglas, A Theory of Production, 18 AM.
ECON. REV. (P APERS & P ROC.) 151–59 (Supp. 1928) (deriving and discussing the
formula); Paul H. Douglas, The Cobb–Douglas Production Function Once Again: Its
History, Its Testing, and Some New Empirical Values, 84 J. P OL. ECON. 903, 903–04
(1976) (discussing the inputs of labor and capital within the Cobb–Douglas formula).
The now-familiar Cobb–Douglas formulation, Y = ALαK β, with Y representing output,
L representing labor, and K representing capital, is a foundational relation in
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as positively related to economic growth.2 If one asks (as
numerous economists have asked) the complicated question of
why some countries are so much richer and produce so much
more than others,3 one can easily rule out the availability of labor
as a limiting input because most developing countries are awash
in cheap labor.4 What is left? Capital.5 Furthermore, more capital
is always better. Additional capital may or may not be worth its
cost, but it never decreases productivity.6
Capital is good, except when it isn’t. After capital is
acquired, new information may emerge suggesting that the
economic theory. Beer, supra, at 44–45 (describing how output can be modeled by this
well-regarded function).
2. Robert Solow’s fundamental neoclassical growth model posits growth as a
general function of labor, capital, and technology, the latter being a multiplier that makes
the other two inputs more productive. Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of
Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65, 66, 85 (1956); see also W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E.
HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 93 (4th
ed. 2005) (emphasizing Solow’s conclusion regarding the relative importance of technology
to output); George N. Hatsopoulos, Paul R. Krugman & Lawrence H. Summers, U.S.
Competitiveness: Beyond the Trade Deficit, 241 SCIENCE 299, 299, 301–02 (1988) (arguing
for a broader definition of capital to explain relative American lagging in productivity
growth); N. Gregory Mankiw, The Growth of Nations, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, no. 1, 1995, at 275, 292, 308 (explaining the positive externalities to capital).
3. See, e.g., Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Ola Olsson, Geography, Biogeography, and
Why Some Countries Are Rich and Others Are Poor, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3715,
3715 (2004) (“The prosperity of nations varies enormously. . . . How can this large
variation in the wealth of nations be explained?”); Mathias Risse, What We Owe to the
Global Poor, 9 J. ETHICS 81, 83 (2005) (tracing the question back to Adam Smith’s Wealth
of Nations).
4. See, e.g., Michael P. Todaro, A Model of Labor Migration and Urban
Unemployment in Less Developed Countries, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 138, 138–39 (1969)
(“[E]ven the most casual observer of these countries cannot help but be overwhelmed by
the proportion of the urban labor force which is apparently untouched by the so-called
‘modern’ economy.”); Adrian Wood, Openness and Wage Inequality in Developing
Countries: The Latin American Challenge to East Asian Conventional Wisdom, 11 WORLD
BANK ECON. REV. 33, 34 (1997) (“The belief that increased openness reduces wage
inequality in developing countries rests on an apparently indisputable fact—that the
supply of unskilled labor, relative to the supply of skilled labor, is larger in developing
than in developed countries . . . .”).
5. Also, technology, which in the Cobb–Douglas and Solow formulations acts as a
multiplier for labor productivity and capital productivity, is not considered an input for
productivity. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer, and
the World Distribution of Income, 87 J. POL. ECON. 253, 254–55, 259 (1979) (developing a
model with labor as the only factor of production, while including technical progress only
in the form of the availability of new products, rather than an increased volume of
production of old products); Richard R. Nelson & Edmund S. Phelps, Investment in
Humans, Technological Diffusion, and Economic Growth, 56 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 69, 71 (1966) (“[T]echnical progress is Harrod-neutral everywhere (i.e., for all
capital-labor ratios), so that progress can be described as purely labor-augmenting.”).
6. Idiosyncratic exceptions may exist, but the Cobb–Douglas production function is
almost never deployed with capital having an inverse relationship with productivity. See
Beer, supra note 1, at 45 (describing the function as concave such that as long as there is
input, output will increase, even if at a decreasing rate).
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capital might not be so useful after all.7 The new information
may reveal some harmful effects of operating that capital or
indicate that continued employment of that capital produces net
social harms. Or, the new information may suggest that capital is
outdated, and that other forms of capital or other technologies
would be more efficient and produce greater net social benefits.
In short, new information can render existing capital obsolete in
a number of different ways, most notably by revealing the
presence of latent negative externalities.8 But even obsolete
capital can be extremely difficult to dislodge.9 Unless obsolete
capital can be profitably redeployed, attempts to regulate or
internalize externalities10 resulting from the operation of capital
will be vigorously opposed by its owners.11
This theory of capital has special application to
environmental externalities, which are by their nature commonly
latent. The most serious environmental problems are no longer
obvious and visceral.12 Leaky industrial drums sitting atop
7. SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO
EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 41, 43 (2011) (“[T]he problem with mandating an expensive
environmental technology is the economic irreversibility of capital expenditures.”);
Clayton Christensen, Thomas Craig & Stuart Hart, The Great Disruption, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 80, 81–82 (describing disruptive technologies—“cheaper, simpler, and
more convenient products or services”—and the challenges these technologies pose for
companies).
8. See Christensen, Craig & Hart, supra note 7, at 81–85 (discussing the effect of
“disruptive technologies”—a form of new information—on existing industries, noting that
these technologies “have plunged many of history’s best companies into crisis and,
ultimately, failure”).
9. See id. at 88–89 (contrasting the American economy’s success at repeating the
cycle of starting new companies that create disruptive growth disruption against the
Japanese economy’s failure to develop a venture-capital infrastructure); infra Part III.B
(explaining how the redeployment of capital is difficult due, in part, to switching costs).
10. An externality is a general term for an effect of a decision, on a party other than
the decision-maker, that the decision-maker does not take into account. For a discussion,
see Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 147 (1979), which
discusses the transaction costs of externalities. “The conventional view of externalities,
whether associated with socially undesirable or desirable activities, is that externalities
arise as the unintended byproduct of otherwise self-serving activities.” Daniel B. Kelly,
Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1649–51 (2011).
11. See C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78
N.C. L. REV. 1357, 1418–19 (2000) (“For the firm, even if externalities reflect real
preferences that people theoretically are willing to pay to satisfy, as long as they are
externalities . . . these preferences are not brought to bear on the firm’s decisions, usually
because of transaction costs or collective action problems. Externalities are irrelevant
because they fall into neither the firm’s expense nor revenue column.”); infra Part III.B
(examining how overcapitalization creates resistance to policy reform).
12. See, e.g., JACK C. BENDER, THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE LATENT ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS IN MINERAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS § 2.01 (1994), available at
http://www.emlf.org/clientuploads/directory/whitepaper/Bender_94.pdf (noting that many
environmental externalities of mineral extraction activities are “hidden and would not be
discovered or anticipated through visual inspection of the property”); Environmental

Do Not Delete

2014]

2/9/2014 4:51 PM

CAPITAL RIGIDITIES

723

playgrounds are no longer the symbol of environmental blight.
The focus of environmental law has turned towards less visible
problems, such as the emission of carbon dioxide causing global
climate change,13 and the emission of fine particulate matter—
less than 2.5 microns in diameter—quietly causing millions of
premature deaths annually.14 But these kinds of environmental
problems only become apparent after decades of careful and
credible research.15 In the meantime, billions of dollars of capital
may accumulate without any serious attempt to consider the
possibility of latent externalities.
Reform or new legislation leading to resolution of modern
environmental problems has thus been elusive well before
Congress reached its current state of gridlock.16 Congress has not
passed a new federal environmental statute since 199017 despite

Effects of Acid Rain, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region1/eco/acidrain/enveffects.html (last
updated Sept. 19, 2013) (discussing some of the more “subtle” effects of acid rain).
13. For a relatively brief treatment of this extremely broad, complex, and literatureheavy problem, see generally ROBERT HENSON, THE ROUGH GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
(1st ed. 2006).
14. An extremely sophisticated body of epidemiological research has emerged over
decades of careful research linking concentrations of fine particulate matter with
premature mortalities. See, e.g., Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air
Pollution and Mortality: Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study, 173 AM. J.
RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 667, 667–69 & tbl.1 (2006) (finding an increase in
overall mortality associated with each 10-µg/m3 increase in fine particulate matter
pollution); Johanna Lepeule et al., Chronic Exposure to Fine Particles and Mortality: An
Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study from 1974 to 2009, 120 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 965, 968 (2012) (finding evidence that exposure to fine particulate matter
can lead to early mortality); C. Arden Pope III et al., Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary
Mortality, and Long-term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 JAMA 1132,
1136 & tbl.2 (2002) (finding that exposure to fine particulate matter is associated with allcause, cardiopulmonary, and lung cancer mortality). Recent studies have estimated that
fine particulate matter pollution causes over two million premature deaths annually,
Raquel A. Silva et al., Global Premature Mortality Due to Anthropogenic Outdoor Air
Pollution and the Contribution of Past Climate Change, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, July–Sept.
2013, at 1, 4, and 1.2 million deaths in China alone, Edward Wong, Early Deaths Linked
to China’s Air Pollution Totaled 1.2 Million in 2010, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2013, at A9.
15. See, e.g., Lepeule et al., supra note 14, at 965, 968 (describing how research
regarding the health impact of fine particulate matter utilized data gathered by Harvard
from 1974 to 1977 and 1979 to 2009).
16. Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Principles for Environmental Reform, 23 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 253, 253 (2013) (arguing that major reform is necessary because only
minor bills have passed since the Clean Air Act in 1990).
17. This Author considers the last significant federal environmental legislation
passed by Congress to be the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,
104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006)). See also Barton
H. Thompson, Jr., A Federal Act to Promote Integrated Water Management: Is the CZMA a
Useful Model?, 42 ENVTL. L. 201, 203 & n.10 (2012) (“Congress has passed neither major
new environmental legislation nor significant water reform measures for almost two
decades.”).
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the existence of a number of under-regulated industries.18
Prevailing explanations for this inertia in these areas of law fall
broadly into three categories: (i) public choice explanations;19
(ii) framing problems;20 and (iii) doubts about the importance of
the underlying problem.21 While all of these explanations have

18. Nicholas Z. Muller, Robert Mendelsohn & William Nordhaus, Environmental
Accounting for Pollution in the United States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649, 1665
(2011) (highlighting seven industries which are not efficiently regulated). Whether certain
industries and industrial practices are truly more harmful than productive is of course a
challenging question to answer, but an important recent analysis suggests good reason to
suspect there are many such industries. Id. at 1664–65. Using integrated assessment
models, which model environmental and economic impacts together, Muller, Mendelsohn,
and Nordhaus created an analysis of the net gross external damages of all point-source
polluters of all pollutants in the United States and found that their best estimates of
gross external damages of seven industries exceed their contribution to economic activity.
Id. at 1659, 1664–65. Those industries are solid waste combustion, stone mining and
quarrying, sewage treatment, oil- and coal-fired power generation, marinas, and
petroleum and coal products. Id. at 1665. Given the somewhat restrictive assumptions in
this study about, for example, nonmarket damages to ecological systems, one suspects
that there are many more than seven industries that are more harmful than valuable. Id.
at 1654, 1667, 1672–73.
19. For example, one common public choice explanation is that intensely affected
regulated industries are more motivated to resist reform than lightly affected and widely
dispersed majorities are to advance reform. See Gebhard Kirchgässner & Friedrich
Schneider, On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy, 115 PUB. CHOICE 369, 373,
377 (2003) (describing how industries burdened by environmental regulations are opposed
to the use of economic instruments). If that is the case, then one might expect the politics
of policy change to favor inertia. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 18, 21–
22, 29 (1962) (assuming actors will “choose ‘more’ rather than ‘less’ when confronted with
the opportunity for choice in a political process,” when “more” advances their economic
position); see also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 3, 12 (1971) (discussing the high costs of legislative reform and stating that
“[t]he smallest industries are . . . effectively precluded from the political process”).
Another public choice explanation might be that agency actors and the industries they
regulate will have repeat interactions. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54–55 (1992) (comparing this
repeat interaction to a multiperiod prisoner’s dilemma game). If that is the case, then one
would expect patterns of cooperation which might, in the face of policy change, give rise to
a systemic resistance to change, lest that upset a status quo that benefits both regulator
and regulated industry. See id. (discussing how the conditions that encourage cooperation
can also encourage capture and corruption).
20. For example, within the category of framing problems, one explanation could be
that the costs of environmental policy are more easily identified and visualized than the
environmental benefits, which tend to take on statistical forms. Shi-Ling Hsu, The
Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 433, 440, 443–44 (2008)
(describing the statistical links between air pollution and health problems as “weak
attractors of sympathy”).
21. There are obviously conflicting accounts of whether the science of climate
change is sufficient or not, but most informed observers of the climate change debate
would agree that the risk of inaction is unjustifiable. A summary of the controversy can be
found in Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
179, 181–89 (2011) (explaining how the distrustful general public has an “inflated
perception of the extent of disagreement among climate scientists”).
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some explanatory power, a theory of how capital impedes energy
and environmental policy reform is the most broadly applicable.
This Article sets forth a theory that is more specific than most
public choice explanations and broader than most psychological
explanations. Just about every proposed reform to address a
latent environmental problem has emerged in the middle of the
economic life of some form of capital and posed a threat to some
individual, firm, or industry that had capital invested in the
status quo.22 Every proposed reform of significance creates losers;
this Article explains how they lose and how much they will resist
losing. If the continued exploitation of capital creates latent
externalities that were not appreciated (or were consciously
ignored) at its time of formation, a split in interests emerges:
cessation of use of the capital may be desirable from the social
point of view, but the owner of the capital will want to continue
to use the capital. This simple story is, in part, the story of
almost every latent externality ever created.
A particularly salient example of this dynamic revolves
around coal-fired electricity generation. Long-lived industrial
capital such as coal-fired power plants played an important role
in generating wealth throughout the world by providing low-cost
electricity.23 The low costs were made possible by abundant
supplies of coal that could be extracted at relatively low costs.24
Thousands of coal-fired power plants were built, and a vast
extraction and distribution network was created to mine coal and
deliver it to these power plants.25 Over time, however, a great
deal of information has emerged suggesting that although the
private costs of mining and burning coal are low, these direct
costs are swamped by the social and environmental costs of coal
mining and combustion.26 Also, new technologies and new
22. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining that reform will only take
place when capital assets have “remaining life”).
23. For a general history of coal, see generally BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN
HISTORY (2003).
24. Id. at 6–7; Sean Patrick Adams, The US Coal Industry in the Nineteenth
Century, ECON. HISTORY ASS’N, http://www.eh.net/encyclopedia/the-us-coal-industry-inthe-nineteenth-century-2/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) (describing coal in the nineteenth
century as “cheap and efficient” and detailing the innovations in coal mining that
facilitated extraction).
25. FREESE, supra note 23, at 118–26.
26. Epidemiological work undertaken over decades has shown that by far, the
greatest cost of coal combustion is in the human toll of premature deaths occurring due to
fine particulate matter emissions. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing
research linking concentrations of fine particulate matter to premature mortalities). For
an estimate of the total damages from coal combustion, see Roberta Mann, Another Day
Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives Encourage Burning Coal and the
Consequences for Global Warming, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 111,
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sources of energy (most prominently natural gas) have emerged
suggesting that coal is not even the cheapest fossil fuel for
generating electricity.27 But the sprawling network of coal
production, distribution, and combustion is fixed. It cannot be
easily redeployed in a low-carbon economy.28 This capital rigidity
has created a huge number of parties with a tremendous stake in
its continued existence.29
This Article sets out a theory of capital that explains how
legal rules and institutions create resistance to reform, especially
attempts to address environmental externalities. Part II of this
Article sets out a working definition of the term “capital.” This
Part also briefly describes the three different types of capital
considered in this Article: physical, human, and social capital.
Part III of this Article sets out examples of how capital impedes
reform attempting to address latent externalities. Part IV

118–25 (2007) (listing external costs on society resulting from the use of coal, including
worker accidents, acid precipitation, and loss of topsoil); Muller, Mendelsohn & Nordhaus,
supra note 18, at 1661, 1665 tbl.2 (discussing the Laden et al. study and showing, using
integrated assessment economic models, external damages of $53.4 billion, which is 2.2
times greater than the value added by coal-fired electricity generation).
27. See Electricity from Non-Hydroelectric Renewable Energy Sources, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/non-hydro.html
(last updated Sept. 25, 2013) (describing how biomass is better for the environment than
burning coal). Natural gas has long been known to be less polluting than coal and, at least
in the environmental sense, a superior fossil fuel. See Electricity from Natural Gas, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/naturalgas.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2013). More recently, the emergence of hydraulic
fracturing technology has rendered natural gas inexpensive enough to rival coal as the
fuel of choice for electricity generating firms. See, e.g., Electric Power Monthly, U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
ENERGY
(Sept.
20,
2013),
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_01 (showing net
generation from natural gas approaching that of coal); Ken Silverstein, Obama Trying to
Escape Political Fallout from Natural Gas Fracking Proposals, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/09/06/obama-trying-to-escape-politicalfallout-from-natural-gas-fracking-proposals/ (describing how the Obama administration
discourages coal-fired power plants and encourages natural gas, which is easier to access
due to hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking”).
28. Coal-fired power plants can be converted to natural-gas-fired power plants, but
the conversion is usually too costly and burdensome. See, e.g., ERIC WILLIAMS ET AL.,
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY P’SHIP, DUKE UNIV., A CONVENIENT GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY 37, 39–40 (2007), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/
ccpp/convenientguide/PDFs/ClimateBook.pdf (giving examples of coal-fired power plants
that have been “repowered,” but conceding that “retiring all coal-fired power plants and
replacing them with less carbon-intensive plants is not economically or politically
feasible”); Daniel Cusick, Study: Switch From Coal to Gas Poses Some Risks for Utilities,
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2013/09/
12/study-converting-coal-to-gas-poses-some-risks-for-utilities/
(describing
how
investments in conversion of a plant are risky due to the uncertain future of the energy
market, particularly the impact of regulations).
29. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how further capital formation in the mining
industry would thwart much-needed policy reform).
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explains how current laws and governmental structures either
overpromote the formation of capital or overprotect it once it is
formed or acquired. Part V argues for a refocusing of government
subsidies on true public goods. Specifically, this Part argues that
government policy should focus more on network goods, and not
just on capital projects that lower commodity prices. This Article
then concludes with some general observations on laws affecting
the formation and protection of capital.
II. WHAT IS CAPITAL?
The term “capital” has an almost universally positive
connotation.30 A fair amount of government policy seems to be
oriented toward promoting the formation and acquisition of
capital. Scattered liberally throughout the Internal Revenue
Code are generous provisions to assist with the formation and
acquisition of capital,31 especially for small businesses.32
President Obama’s economic stimulus packages of 2008 and 2009
included temporary provisions to allow an increased tax
deduction for certain capital equipment.33 There is even a
Washington-based advocacy group that extols the virtues of

30. The Future of Capital Formation: Hearing Before the Comm. on Oversight &
Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112hhrg70517/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg70517.pdf (“Facilitating capital formation, protecting
investors, and maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets is the mission of the SEC.
Cost-effective access to capital for companies of all sizes plays a critical role in our
national economy, and companies seeking access to capital should not be overburdened by
unnecessary or superfluous regulations.”). Also, Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933
regarding “consideration of promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation”
provides, in part:
Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012).
31. See, e.g., Robert E. Hall & Dale W. Jorgenson, Tax Policy and Investment
Behavior, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 391, 391, 410 (1967) (attributing investment booms in the
1950s and 1960s to changes in tax policy).
32. See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Public Policy Toward Entrepreneurship, 15
SMALL BUS. ECON. 283, 288–89 (2000) (describing such benefits for small businesses
including, for example, possible yearly deductions of up to $17,500 in capital
expenditures); Philip F. Zeidman et al., The Small Business Investment Company—A Tool
for Economic Self-Help, 21 BUS. LAW. 947, 950, 961 (1966) (describing the special tax
benefits for small business investment companies, such as creating a debt reserve of up to
ten percent of outstanding loans and special rules for the deduction of dividends).
33. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, § 103, 122 Stat. 613, 618–
19; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1201, 123 Stat.
115, 333–35.
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capital formation for its own sake, the American Council for
Capital Formation.34 The worship of capital may be even more
pronounced in capital-poor developing countries, for which
prescriptions center upon making capital more available.35 It is
the formation of capital, everyone seems to believe, that creates
low commodity prices and broadly distributed benefits,
unleashing the industry and entrepreneurship of individuals and
firms in an economic society.
And yet, despite our universal admiration for capital, a
precise and widely accepted definition of capital is elusive. Adam
Smith defined it as “[h]is . . . stock . . . . which, he expects, is to
afford him [his] revenue.”36 In a similar vein, Robert Solow has
defined it in passing as generically a “stock of produced or
natural factors of production that can be expected to yield
productive services for some time.”37 Gregory Mankiw posits
capital as current consumption forgone to produce more income
tomorrow.38 Undergraduate textbooks simply model production
as a function of just two types of inputs: capital and labor.39 This
dichotomy is a gross oversimplification, of course. Labor is
required to build the capital in the first place; in that sense,
capital can simply be thought of as stored labor.40

34. Economic Policy, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION, http://accf.org/
publications/#economic-policy-tab (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
35. Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital propounds a theory that people in
developing countries fail to accumulate wealth because their property cannot be leveraged
as capital the way that it can in developing countries. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY
OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 5–6
(2000). Muhammad Yunus won a Nobel Peace Prize for his pioneering work in the
business of microfinance in poor communities, making small loans to collateral-poor
entrepreneurs. Muhammad Yunus—Facts, NOBEL PRIZE, http://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-facts.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
36. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 162 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1776).
37. Robert M. Solow, Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance, in SOCIAL
CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 6 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds.,
2000).
38. Mankiw, supra note 2, at 293.
39. David Gordon & Richard Vaughan, The Historical Role of the Production
Function in Economics and Business, AM. J. BUS. EDUC., Apr. 2011, at 25, 25. The nowfamiliar Cobb–Douglas formulation, Y = ALαKβ, is a relation which every economics
student learns about in undergraduate economics, and it posits production as a function
of the quantity and productivity of just two types of inputs: labor (L) and capital (K). See
generally Cobb & Douglas, supra note 1 (deriving and discussing the Cobb–Douglas
formula); Douglas, supra note 1 (discussing the inputs of labor and capital within the
Cobb–Douglas formula). Robert Solow’s fundamental neoclassical growth model posits
growth as a general function of labor, capital, and technology, the latter being a multiplier
that makes the other two inputs more productive. Solow, supra note 2, at 65–66, 85.
40. Hernando de Soto notes that capital “must be fixed and realized in some
particular subject which lasts for some time at least after that labour is past. It is, as it
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These, and a number of other definitional complexities, have
led to some more conceptual and less rigid formulations of
capital. Gary Becker has, in his seminal work, married labor and
capital into “human capital” to denote the amount of human
training and education that is undertaken to produce other
things (or services).41 Indeed, a broad notion of capital is central
to the thesis of this Article, as the mystery of how capital retards
environmental policy reform can only be unlocked when
considering the many forms of capital invested in polluting
behavior.
This Article sets forth a working definition that does not
seek to bridge or synthesize differences among the economic
giants that have considered this topic. For purposes of this
Article, I define capital as a long-lived asset that generates a
stream of benefits. Capital is long-lived in the sense that it is
meant to be durable and undergo sustained use over a period of
time or more generally over a quantity of production.42 Capital
generates a stream of benefits because that is why it is obtained
in the first place.43
Capital is not necessarily costly. In some cases, capital is
accumulated without effort or cost.44 But even in such cases of
windfall capital, a possessor’s defense of that capital can be as
vigorous as that of costly capital.45 The costliness of capital may,
were, a certain quantity of labour stocked up and stored to be employed, if necessary,
upon some other occasion.” DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 42 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
41. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 16–17 (3d ed. 1993) (expounding on the concept
of “human capital” and claiming that “[e]ducation and training are the most important
investments in human capital”).
42. See Paul S. Adler & Seok-Woo Kwon, Social Capital: Prospects for a New
Concept, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 17, 25 (2002) (defining all forms of capital as “long-lived
asset[s] into which other resources can be invested, with the expectation of a
future . . . flow of benefits”); Solow, supra note 37, at 6 (“Generically, ‘capital’ stands for a
stock of produced or natural factors of production that can be expected to yield productive
services for some time.”).
43. See, e.g., Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 265 (1958)
(stating that a firm’s assets will provide its shareholders with a “stream of profits” during
a given period of time (internal quotation marks omitted)).
44. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 41, at 21–22 (illustrating how human capital can
be accumulated and developed through children’s family and upbringing); Elinor Ostrom,
Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept?, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 172, 174 (“Many types of capital can be created without
money, or with very little of it . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., Christopher L. Dyer & Mark Moberg, The ‘Moral Economy’ of
Resistance: Turtle Excluder Devices and Gulf of Mexico Shrimp Fishermen, 5 MAR.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUD., no. 1, 1992, at 18, 20–21 (explaining how fishermen develop
their skill sets and “vehemently resist perceived threats to livelihood”).
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for psychological reasons, inspire more spirited defense, but for
purposes of this Article is not a predicate to the points made in
this Article.
I consider three kinds of capital: physical, human, and
social.46 There are many other kinds of assets to which the label
of “capital” has been attached.47 But these three forms of capital,
as I describe them below, are the forms of capital that have
played a prominent role in retarding policy reform to address
latent environmental externalities.48
Physical capital is capital that takes on a tangible, physical
form.49 For example, a power plant, with a useful life of at least
forty years,50 is an asset that generates a stable stream of
revenues in the form of consumer electricity payments. Indeed,
ensuring that environmental regulation does not threaten the
size or the continuity of that stream of benefits occupies a
considerable amount of attention from the owners of that
capital.51 A stable regulatory and price environment is the ideal
46. Many scholars consider social capital to be a recent addition to the three
previously widely-accepted forms of capital: physical, human, and natural. See Ostrom,
supra note 44, at 172–76; Norman Uphoff, Understanding Social Capital: Learning from
the Analysis and Experience of Participation, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 215, 215, 217 (noting that social capital is a recent
conceptualization of capital, which traditionally has consisted of “the standard three
categories of capital”—physical, natural, and human).
47. Natural resources and environmental conditions can constitute “natural
capital.” See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 44, at 174, 182 (inferring that natural resources are
a form of capital because the removal of natural resources can be detrimental to social
capital); M.V. Russo, The Emergence of Sustainable Industries: Building on Natural
Capital, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 317, 320 (2003) (defining “natural capital” in terms of
natural resources). Capital can also be financial. The term “capital markets” is commonly
used to refer to equity markets, or stock markets, in which invested monies are hoped to
generate a future benefit in the form of a stock dividend or an increased share value over
time. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (“The primary role of the capital market is allocation of
ownership of the economy’s capital stock.”); Lindon J. Robison, A. Allan Schmid &
Marcelo E. Siles, Is Social Capital Really Capital?, 60 REV. SOC. ECON. 1, 7 (2002)
(defining financial capital as “the symbols and rights associated with credit and money”).
48. See discussion infra Part III.A–B. (describing how capital has encumbered
policy reform in certain industries, which, in turn, has led to environmental problems).
49. See Ostrom, supra note 44, at 174 (providing examples of “physical capital” such
as “buildings, roads, waterworks, tools, cattle and other animals, automobiles, trucks, and
tractors”).
50. For example, a recent regulation by Environment Canada to apply a new
emissions performance standard for coal-fired power plants “at the end of their useful life”
assumed a useful life of a power plant to be forty-five years. Reduction of Carbon Dioxide
Emissions from Coal-Fired Generation of Electricity Regulations, 145 C. Gaz. 2779, 2783
(Can. Aug. 27, 2011), available at http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2011/2011-0827/pdf/g1-14535.pdf.
51. See, e.g., Satish Joshi, Ranjani Krishnan & Lester Lave, Estimating the
Hidden Costs of Environmental Regulation, 76 ACCT. REV. 171, 173–74, 194 (2001)
(providing an example of how industries consider the stream of benefits and costs
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environment, if not the sine qua non of the investment of such
capital.52 The costliness of physical capital such as a power
plant,53 coupled with the long time horizons involved in paying
for such capital,54 lends urgency to the task of monitoring and
managing, to the greatest extent possible, the regulatory and
price environments.
Human capital is most often thought of as education and
training.55 Generally speaking, the higher the education, the
greater the value of the human capital.56 Education can be costly,
not only because of direct costs, but also because of the

when determining whether to bring old plants into environmental compliance or to
shut them down).
52. See Alfred Marcus, J. Alberto Aragon-Correa & Jonatan Pinkse, Firms,
Regulatory Uncertainty, and the Natural Environmental, 54 CAL. MGMT. REV. 5, 8–9
(2011) (observing that when the “regulatory trajectory” is certain, industries and firms
will have more stability in their investments).
53. Coal-fired power plants that entered service in 2010 have an estimated average
“overnight” capital cost of $2,844 to $3,565 per kilowatt of capacity. See U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, UPDATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR
ELECTRICITY GENERATION PLANTS 3, 7 tbl.1 (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/
oiaf/beck_plantcosts/pdf/updatedplantcosts.pdf. The overnight capital cost is “an estimate
of the cost at which a plant could be constructed assuming that the entire process from
planning through completion could be accomplished in a single day.” Id. at 2 n.2.
54. As a crude order-of-magnitude calculation, assuming a capacity rate of eightyfive percent—meaning that the plant runs at an average long-term capacity of eighty-five
percent, an assumption made by the U.S. Department of Energy in calculating capital
costs—a 500-megawatt power plant would generate 425 megawatt-hours every hour,
every day, or 3,723,000 megawatt-hours per year. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, LEVELIZED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2013, at 4 & tbl.1 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/
electricity_generation.pdf. Using the average 2011 nationwide retail price of electricity,
$88.10 per megawatt-hour, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL
ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 255 & tbl.8.10 (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/
totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/sec8_39.pdf, and subtracting out average operations and
maintenance costs of $35.09 per megawatt-hour, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T
OF
ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2011, tbl.8.4 (2012), available at
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf, it would take 7.8 years to pay back the
capital costs. Of course, this crude calculation omits many other costs, factors, and
variables, including finance costs, transmission costs, and other expenses associated with
running a power plant.
55. BECKER, supra note 41, at 17.
56. See id. at 169–70 & tbl.4, 223–24 & tbl.17 (showing greater earning capacities
for college graduates compared to high school graduates). Although the marginal returns
to a college education have not always been historically higher than the marginal returns
to high school education, the marginal returns to college education have always been
positive. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND
TECHNOLOGY 76, 78–79 & tbl.2.5 (2008) (showing positive returns to college schooling);
Richard Vedder, Universities and Income Equality: New Evidence and Conjectures,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/
universities-and-income-equality-new-evidence-and-conjectures (discussing the “law of
diminishing returns” as applied to higher education).
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opportunity costs of forgone income.57 Indisputably, human
capital is valuable, as productivity is observed to be clearly and
consistently greater in the presence of human capital.58 Thus
human capital is, by itself, something that generates a stream of
benefits, in the form of earnings that would not otherwise be
realized.
Importantly, human capital need not be formal. While
human capital is most easily conceived as formal schooling or onthe-job training,59 there are clearly many other forms of human
capital. Human capital may be the acquired knowledge of some
facet of resource extraction, or some operational expertise
connected to a specific industrial process. The acquisition of
human capital may not be part of any organized effort at all.
Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates and Apple co-founder Steve Jobs,
both college dropouts, owe a considerable amount of their success
to human capital they acquired at early, formative stages of life.60
In almost all cases, human capital requires significant costs to
obtain, has the potential to be long-lived, and can generate a
long-lived stream of benefits.61
Finally, social capital, as it is conceived in this Article,
consists of the variety of interpersonal and intra-organizational
bonds that are formed when one signals to another that
cooperation is sought.62 Among economists, there is some

57. See, e.g., Theodore W. Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POL.
ECON. 571, 573, 577 (1960) (stating that students incur opportunity costs while in college
such as reduced leisure and forgone income from employment not requiring an education).
58. Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3
(1961) (“[K]nowledge and skill are in great part the product of investment and, combined
with other human investment, predominantly account for the productive superiority of
the technically advanced countries.”).
59. For example, Becker’s original empirical work focuses on the measurable
benefits of schooling and on-the-job training. See BECKER, supra note 41, at 17–21 (noting
that the most important components of human capital are education and on-the-job
training).
60. MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 50–54 (2008)
(describing the “extraordinary series of opportunities” that Gates was presented with at
an early age); WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 3–20 (2011) (illustrating how Steve Jobs
acquired human capital at an early age by getting hands-on experience with computers
and electronics).
61. See BECKER, supra note 41, at 117 (stating that human capital is expensive due
to the high cost of education and the long period required to accumulate knowledge and
skills); James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J.
SOC. 95, 116 (Supp. 1988) (“[T]he person who invests the time and resources in building
up [human] capital reaps its benefits in the form of a higher-paying job, more satisfying or
higher-status work, or even the pleasure of greater understanding of the surrounding
world.”).
62. See Ostrom, supra note 44, at 176 (defining “social capital” and noting that
individuals can be more productive when activities are coordinated).
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controversy as to whether the term “capital” can be coherently
applied to something like the social interactions that make up
what is popularly referred to as social capital.63 For those
economists that engage with the concept of social capital, the
focus is typically on how it increases productivity. After all, what
good would social capital be, apart from the psychological
benefits of social belonging?64 If social capital is to have economic
content, then it must have a role in economic performance.
What is different about social capital is that the social
interactions that make up social capital do not primarily have
economic motivations. The concept of social capital thus draws
heavily from the work of Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone,65
which chronicles the decline of social institutions in the United
States, the result of which is a lack of a social fabric that made
many cooperative endeavors possible in the past.66 Putnam’s
argument is that social networks enhance political and civic
life without consciously having these outcomes as objectives.67
The economic perspective is thus analogous to Putnam’s
argument: social capital enhances economic productivity
without consciously having economic productivity as its
primary goal.68

63. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL:
A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 3, 3–4 (advocating the abandonment of
“social capital” terminology); Robison, Schmid & Siles, supra note 47, at 7–8 (“We don’t
need the new word ‘social capital.’”); Solow, supra note 37, at 6–7 (criticizing the idea of
“social capital” because the original meaning of “capital” was associated with physical,
durable objects).
64. Economists argue that joining social networks have noneconomic benefits, and
are at least in part the motivation for joining. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 63, at 3 (“There
is considerable consensus also that much of the reward for social interactions is
intrinsic—that is, the interaction is the reward—or at least that the motives for
interaction are not economic. People may get jobs through networks of friendship or
acquaintance, but they do not, in many cases, join the networks for that purpose.”);
Robison, Schmid & Siles, supra note 47, at 7–17 (explaining how some critics argue that
social capital does not contain an opportunity cost, which is an essential component to
true “capital,” but arguing that social capital does in fact exhibit many of the qualities of
“capital”).
65. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 351–52, 358 (2000) (discussing how social capital is intertwined
with the concepts of liberty, tolerance, and equality).
66. Id. at 352–59 (positing that social capital began to decline in the 1960s when
“tolerance and diversity blossomed,” causing Americans to become “disconnected from
civic life and from one another”).
67. Id. at 359 (“[I]n high-social-capital states people from different social classes are
equally likely to attend public meetings, to lead local organizations, and the like . . . .”).
68. See Arrow, supra note 63, at 4 (“The essence of social networks is that they are
built up for reasons other than their economic value to the participants . . . .”); Ostrom,
supra note 44, at 174 (observing that human-made capital, including social capital, is
accumulated incidental to other activities and leads to more income).
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Drawing on the working definition of capital set forth in this
Article, social capital is just another asset that is long-lived and
can generate a long-lived stream of benefits. Of the three forms of
capital considered in this paper, it is the least costly and timeconsuming to acquire, and the stream of benefits flowing from it
consists of a number of intangible benefits, be it informational
benefits or just the small favors and graces extended to those
within a social fabric.69 These benefits can be extremely
important. James Coleman provides a compelling example of the
importance of social capital in the Jewish diamond merchant
community, in which merchants entrust fellow merchants with
diamonds worth very large amounts of money.70 The reason that
thievery is nonexistent in this community, despite ample
opportunity to engage in it, is explained by the social
interconnectedness of the merchants. Stealing would result in
ostracism from a community and forfeiture of social, family, and
religious ties.71 Social capital thus often plays a vital economic
role, lubricating mercantile relations while obviating the need for
expensive and perhaps ultimately futile monitoring.72
Social capital could play a critical role in motivating poor,
resource-based communities to fight regulation. In resourcebased communities otherwise lacking in physical or human
capital, social capital is a more egalitarian form of capital,
requiring few of the financial resources that are necessary and
sometimes unavailable to socioeconomically disadvantaged
groups.73 Strong social interconnectedness has been observed in a
variety of fishing communities.74 As it happens, fishers are, even
among resource industries, legendary for their resistance to
regulation.75 As in the Jewish diamond broker example, trust and
69. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 61, at 98–99 (inferring that social capital requires
fewer expenditures because it is formed through relations and interactions).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 99.
72. See id. (observing that strong “family, religious, and community ties” yield
relationships built on trust with little cost).
73. Putnam has written that “[h]istorically social capital has been the main weapon
of the have-nots, who lacked other forms of capital.” PUTNAM, supra note 65, at 359.
74. James M. Acheson, The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy,
1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 385, 385–86 (1985); Sean R. Lauer, Entrepreneurial Processes in an
Emergent Resource Industry: Community Embeddedness in Maine’s Sea Urchin Industry,
70 RURAL SOC. 145, 156, 158–59, 162 (2005); James A. Wilson, Adaptation to Uncertainty
and Small Numbers Exchange: The New England Fresh Fish Market, 11 BELL J. ECON.
491, 494–95 (1980).
75. See, e.g., Dyer & Moberg, supra note 45, at 27–31 (examining the strong
resistance among shrimp fishermen toward federal regulation); Shi-Ling Hsu, What Is a
Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 75, 128 (2005); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to
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reciprocity, the social capital that is formed from long-running
relationships, have served a vital economic purpose for low-profit
industries that cannot afford expensive or time-consuming
monitoring efforts.76 Indeed, when social capital is low—when
interconnectedness is not present—fishing communities that
otherwise resemble other communities with high social capital
function much less efficiently and are much less profitable.77
Social capital is still, in a sense, costly to obtain, as it
requires time and effort to earn trust and to credibly signal the
intent to cooperate. Like physical and human capital, once
created by sustained cooperation or assistance, social capital can
yield a stream of benefits that becomes extremely valuable and in
some cases, economically necessary. Even though social capital is
not readily monetizable, it can be even more valuable to its
holder than tangible assets like physical capital.78 Perhaps more
significantly, it can be the only form of capital held by some
individuals and some groups.79
To be sure, most capital contains combinations of all three
kinds of capital.80 Physical capital contains the embedded human
capital required to design and build a highly sophisticated and
expensive piece of equipment. Social capital is invariably
embedded as well, in the form of the informal cooperative
arrangements that are needed for a large-scale endeavor to be
productive. Physicality is just the most obvious aspect of capital.
III. HOW CAPITAL IMPEDES REFORM
Exactly how does the presence of excess capital impede
policy reform? This Part briefly describes the capital that is

Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 244–45 (2000) (“Many resource users,
moreover, might conclude that they are better off in a commons free-for-all than in a
world constrained by property rights, unified management, or regulation.”).
76. Coleman, supra note 61, at 98–99; Wilson, supra note 74, at 495 (“[T]he
economic significance of a trustworthy relationship lies in the reduction in [an
individual’s] costs of verifying the statements of the other party. This reduction in
transactions costs creates strong economic forces which favor the extension of the
bilateral relationship to exchanges of other goods and services.”).
77. See Sean R. Lauer, Exchange Relationships in Inshore Fisheries, 23 SOC. F. 503,
506–07 (2008) (discussing how low social capital creates distrust and opportunism,
causing increased transaction costs due to “frequent misunderstandings, conflicts, delays
and breakdowns, and increased investment in the monitoring of exchanges”).
78. Adler & Kwon, supra note 42, at 22, 29–30; see PUTNAM, supra note 65, at 359
(showing that groups of individuals lacking the means to obtain expensive forms of capital
rely heavily on social capital).
79. PUTNAM, supra note 65, at 359.
80. Coleman, supra note 61, at 100–01 (describing the linkage between physical,
human, and social capital).
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embedded in a number of industries that have been belatedly
shown to cause a number of environmental problems. This Part
then sets out a simple model showing how relatively small
incentives for capital formation might lead to large increases in
capital investment, creating a tendency to “super-size” capital.
A. Overcapitalization as a Drag on Environmental Reform
The thesis of this Article is that legal rules and institutions
have helped create too much capital, which has led to a
heightened resistance to legal reform. Legal rules and
institutions have overpromoted the formation of capital that is
later discovered to cause latent environmental harms.81 Even
after the latent environmental harms come to light, laws have
overprotected capital at the expense of environmental quality.82
This is at least in part the story of how almost every
environmental externality has been allowed to persist longer
than a rational society would have allowed.83 In some way,
capital has gotten in the way of solving almost every
environmental problem in the history of humankind.84
It is important to consider capital in its varied forms, not
just the physical capital—the bricks and mortar that are easily
priced and monetizable—but the human and social capital that is
intertwined with industrial practices and processes. The

81. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem with New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,095, 10,096–98 (2006) (discussing “grandfather clauses” and how such laws have
permitted industries to infuse more capital into older facilities, leading to environmental
problems); Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You:
Environmental “Grandfather Clauses” and Their Role in Environmental Inequity, 45
CATH. U. L. REV. 131, 168–70 (1995) (suggesting that “grandfather clauses” have allowed
industries to opt out of complying with environmental regulations, thus avoiding
expensive capital outlays and causing further environmental damage).
82. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 81, at 168–70 (asserting that laws such as
“grandfather clauses” have overprotected capital at the expense of environmental harm).
83. Id. (advocating that the allowance of capital-protective laws prolongs
environmental harms).
84. See, e.g., Cees van Beers & Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Environmental Harm
of Hidden Subsidies: Global Warming and Acidification, 38 AMBIO 339, 339–41 (2009)
(explaining how reliance on government subsidies, a form of capital, have prolonged
environmental emissions problems); R.T. Paine et al., Trouble on Oiled Waters: Lessons
from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 27 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 197, 222, 228
(1996) (discussing how then-existing capital was ineffective to clean up the Exxon Valdez
oil spill and suggesting superior capital); Lawrence C. Smith, Jr., L. Murphy Smith &
Paul A. Ashcroft, Analysis of Environmental and Economic Damages from British
Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 74 ALB. L. REV. 563, 565, 572–74 (2010)
(attributing lack of physical and human capital, such as clean-up crews, vessels, and
equipment, to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill’s damaging effects, as well as lack of social
capital in the form of blocking aid from countries that had offered to help with the
cleanup).
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operation of physical capital to generate wealth requires a
tremendous amount of human capital and industry-specific
know-how. In addition, any endeavor of any reasonable size
requires informal cooperation and the development of a network
of social capital. The importance of such human and social capital
is likely to be understated because their acquisition costs will
generally not reflect their intrinsic value.85 For individuals
possessing human capital that would be devalued by changes in
industrial practices (such as oil rig or oilfield workers), or social
capital that is specific to a small town that is predicated on a
specific practice (such as that of a fishing or coal-mining
community), their role in an anachronistic industry may be the
only realistic source of income or sustenance. If, as is very often
the case, these kinds of human or social capital may not be
transferred to another setting, the switching costs for these
people are essentially infinite. Were the source of income in these
industries and communities to dry up, these people would
essentially lose everything. That desperation may be a false
perception, but for purposes of explaining the level of resistance
to reform, it may as well be reality.
When these broader forms of capital are considered, it becomes
less of a mystery as to why policy reform can be so politically and
legally painful. Cost-benefit analyses do not capture the full array of
perceived costs: the losses to human and social capital occurring
after environmental regulation (or some other economic change) are
highly salient to those possessing it, and far exceed any monetizable
amount.86 And yet, there is no basis for taking such human and
capital costs into account, or for compensating the holders of such
capital; there is no inherent societal value of human or social capital
if it is specific to an anachronistic industry.87
Overcapitalization plays a central role in the greatest
environmental problem and market failure ever: global climate

85. See Adler & Kwon, supra note 42, at 22 (stating that social capital is not
“amenable to quantified measurement”); Mankiw, supra note 2, at 293–94 (asserting that
human capital has the potential to be underestimated due to the complexity of valuing its
variables).
86. See Jessica Crowe, The Role of Natural Capital on the Pursuit and
Implementation of Economic Development, 51 SOC. PERSP. 827, 833 (2008) (inferring that
environmental regulations can have negative impacts on communities, including social
and human capital aspects); David S. Reay, Costing Climate Change, 360 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 2947, 2948–49 (2002) (observing that cost–benefit analyses
with respect to climate change are not always able to reflect all of the social,
technological, or environmental costs of emissions).
87. See Adler & Kwon, supra note 42, at 22 (positing that social capital costs are
difficult to monetize); Mankiw, supra note 2, at 293–94 (inferring that human capital
costs are oftentimes undervalued).
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change.88 Developed economies have developed largely because of
capital-intensive energy sectors.89 Thanks to sprawling energy
infrastructures, fossil fuels are efficiently extracted, transported,
and burned to generate energy at low prices. The problem is that
greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel-based economies
threaten to irreversibly and catastrophically warm the planet.90
Coal, the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels, continues to
play a central role in energy provision.91 As noted briefly above,92
strong convincing evidence exists that coal combustion, given its
social and environmental costs and its contribution to climate
change, is simply no longer worth it.93 And yet, coal combustion
persists. Most energy forecasts project an increase in coal
production.94 The world’s stock of coal-fired power plants, with a
combined value in the trillions of dollars,95 are not about to be
abandoned. And it is not only the existing stock of coal-fired
power plants that comprise the sluggish capital, but the human
and social capital that is locked into a fossil fuel-centered way of
doing things may ultimately consign the world population to
living on a climate-changed planet.
All this is to say that capital, in all its forms, has played a
special role in blocking environmental law and policy reform.

88. Nicholas Stern, the author of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, has called climate change the “greatest market failure the world has seen.”
NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xviii, 4, 27
(2007) (attributing climate change to human activities); supra notes 81–82 and
accompanying text (discussing how overcapitalization helped perpetuate the harmful
effects of greenhouse emissions).
89. See Michal C. Moore, Renewable Technologies to Power and Empower the
Developing World, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 377, 378, 383–90 (2005) (discussing
energy’s importance to developed and developing nations).
90. For a brief review of the voluminous literature on greenhouse gases and the
risks of climate change, see HENSON, supra note 13, at 20.
91. Id. at 289–90.
92. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
93. Even the most conservative estimates of the costs of climate change, coupled
with other externalities, suggest that the benefits of this anachronistic industry are far
exceeded by the costs. See, e.g., Muller, Mendelsohn & Nordhaus, supra note 18, at 1665
(showing that coal plants have damages and costs that exceed the benefits).
94. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AEO2014 EARLY RELEASE
OVERVIEW 17–18 tbl.1 (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er
(2014).pdf.
95. A very rough estimate of the value of the stock of the world’s coal-fired power
plants can be obtained by multiplying world capacity, IEA ENERGY TECH. NETWORK,
COAL-FIRED POWER (2010), available at http://www.iea-etsap.org/web/E-TechDS/PDF/E01coal-fired-power-GS-AD-gct.pdf; Electricity Generating Capacity, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/capacity/, by a
weighted average of overnight costs, weighted by plant location, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY,
PROJECTED COSTS OF GENERATING ELECTRICITY 2010, at 60 (2010). This back-of-theenvelope calculation is $3.6 trillion USD.
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Perhaps more than even the stickiness of physical capital,
environmental policy reform has bumped up against human and
social capital that has become specialized to a specific industry or
practice. These forms of capital can come to represent the very
identity of a firm, person, or group. Destroying that capital can
appear to be tantamount to destruction of that firm, person, or
group. Resistance to reform will naturally be vigorous.
B. A Model of How Capital Impedes Reform
To see how this overcapitalization can lead to policy inertia,
consider a simple stylized example of two types of investments: a
low-capital-cost, low-benefit-stream investment, and a highcapital-cost, high-benefit-stream investment. The goal of any
acquisition of any capital is to enjoy a stream of future benefits,
but along with a higher stream of future benefits comes the risk
that the future benefits may not fully materialize (for example,
due to an unfavorable change in the regulatory or economic
environment). Absent risk, the long-term value of the highcapital-cost, high-benefit-stream investment is greater.96 In this
simple example, the only reason to choose a low-capital, lowprofit strategy over high-capital, high-profit strategy is the
avoidance of risk. Of course, this abstracts away from many other
determinants of capital ownership, like access to capital and
discounting, and abstracts away from many other attributes of
capital ownership, like market power and signaling benefits or
detriments (like prestige or scorn). But heuristically, it is
reasonable to work from the simplifying assumptions that the
only reason to take on more expensive capital and the attendant
risk is to generate a larger stream of benefits.
These two strategies are graphically depicted in Figure 1.
Two different firms make a capital investment at an initial
investment cost, C1, for the high-capital, high-profit strategy,
and C2, for the low-capital, low-profit strategy. The cost of
capital instantly drives down firm profitability, but capital
generates a revenue stream that increases firm profitability as
sales of the produced good generate revenues to pay back the cost
of capital. In Figure 1, the profitability of the firms, i.e., the
cumulative sum total of firm revenues and expenses, is graphed
as a function of q, the quantity of sales. This cumulative profit
line—the solid line for the high-capital, high-profit strategy—has

96. “Risk” is defined as “a chance of injury or loss.” Elke U. Weber & Richard A.
Milliman, Perceived Risk Attitudes: Relating Risk Perception to Risky Choice, 43 MGMT.
SCI. 123, 128 (1997).

Do Not Delete

740

2/9/2014 4:51 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[51:3

a steeper slope than the dotted line than that for the low-capital,
low-profit strategy. Figure 1 represents the simple case in which
the price and operating costs are constant for all units sold, so
that profitability is linear in q. In an even simpler case, sales
would be uniform over units and also over time, so that the
horizontal axis could be time and the payback period represented
by the point in time at which the profitability crosses the
horizontal axis.
Ultimately, capital generates a cumulative profit. Assuming
the expected life of the capital in both cases to be h, the cost of
risk associated with the high-capital, high-profit strategy is r.
This also abstracts away from considerations having to do with
discounting.
Figure 1

Ex ante, the cost of risk is simply a premium that is
assumed by the firm adopting a high-capital, high-profit
strategy. The premium compensates for the risk of a regulatory
change that, in this simple case, renders the capital obsolete
and valueless. So if a firm is risk-taking, it adopts the highcapital, high-profit strategy because the risk premium is
sufficient compensation for the risk. Relatively risk-averse firms
will opt for the low-capital, low-profit strategy. In Figures 2a
and 2b below, a regulatory change that renders the capital
obsolete and valueless occurs when the firm has sold x units.
The losses for the high-capital, high-profit strategy and the low-
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n in Figures 2a and 2b

Figure 2b.

It is thus not the capital itself that industries, firms, and
individuals fight vigorously to protect; it is the expected stream
of benefits that inspires such vigorous defense. It so happens that
most of the time we should expect that the more expensive the
capital, the greater the stream of benefits. But that would be an
imprecise conclusion. Expected benefits could well be capitalized
into a valuation of capital, but far from being universally true,
there is ample reason to suspect that capital is rarely perfectly
priced to reflect the expected stream of benefits.97 Ultimately, it
is the hoped-for stream of benefits that a firm, having acquired
capital, will struggle to protect; it will expend any amount up to
the value of the hoped-for but lost stream of benefits.98
Obviously, the loss suffered by an unfavorable change in the
legal or economic environment is greater in the high-capital,
high-profit scenario; there is a larger stream of benefits to lose.
All other things being equal, as long as the high-capital, highprofit strategy yields higher marginal profits (again, this is
assumed, because in this simple model there would otherwise be
no reason to expend higher amounts of capital), the loss L1 will
always be greater than the loss L2.
What is nonintuitive about the role of capital is the ex post
amplification of the importance of the initial investment. Ex ante,
the equilibrium cost of the risk is r. Ex post, however, once the

97. See, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher, On the Misuse of the Profits–Sales Ratio to Infer
Monopoly Power, 18 RAND J. ECON. 384, 385, 392–94 (1987).
98. See Patrick Gaughan, Paul Lerman & Donald Manley, Measuring Damages
Resulting from Lost Functionality of Systems, J. LEGAL ECON., July 1993, at 11, 14–17
(describing capital budgeting techniques which weigh the current investment expenditure
with the future value of the stream of benefits that investment will likely produce).
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capital is sunk, the stake is not just r, nor is it just the cost of
capital. After the initial investment in capital, the risk of loss is
equal to the expected stream of benefits. In order to combat such
a loss, the owner of capital will expend any amount of money up
to the expected loss (L1 or L2), which could well exceed the cost
of the capital (C1 or C2). So the amount of money spent on
resisting policy change can be highly sensitive to initial decisions
on capital investment. Just a subtle nudge, such as that provided
by an obscure legal provision, can magnify differences in capital
investment and lead to a very different world in terms of
incentives to resist policy change.
Whether a firm chooses the high-capital, high-profit strategy
or not thus has profound implications for economic efficiency. Put
simply, the greater the value of the capital, the greater the threat
of obsolescence for the firm owning the capital, and the greater
efforts it will undertake to resist reform. An overcapitalized
society will be a society in which there are more efforts to resist
reform. Because capital in its various forms regularly experiences
obsolescence,99 a capital-protecting society is a society that is less
agile and less receptive to reform that threatens the value of that
capital.
Note that losses L1 and L2 are only fully realized if the
capital is “stranded,” or unsusceptible of redeployment. More
generally, the problem of avoiding loss can be considered as a
problem with switching costs, and the losses L1 and L2 can be
more generally considered the net costs of being forced
(economically or by regulation) to switch capital to a new use. L1
and L2 are thus the lesser of switching costs and the complete
economic loss of a stream of benefits.
This theory of capital-protecting offers insight into a further
subtlety. When there is human or social capital involved, the
monetization of a stream of benefits could appear quite small in
comparison with the value of physical capital. But when the stream
of benefits generated by that human or social capital is perceived
(accurately or not) to be the only possible source of income, the
marginal value of the stream of benefits generated by that human
or social capital can be extremely high to the capital holder, perhaps
even infinite. Defense of this kind of capital could be very vigorous.
In sum, capital will always pose a barrier to policy reform
because policy reform will always take place when some capital
99. For example, one form of capital discussed in this Article, nuclear power plants,
frequently becomes obsolete. See, e.g., Stephen Maloney, PLEX: Nuclear Plant Life
Extension or Extinction?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 15, 1992, at 15, 19–20 (discussing
SONGS 1, a nuclear power plant originally built in 1967 that has since become obsolete).
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assets have some remaining life and have the capacity to
generate a prospective stream of benefits.100 Switching costs are
never zero, so redeployment will always be costly.101 A normal
economy will thus always generate some resistance to policy
change. But the problem identified in this Article is that legal
rules have biased capital decisions toward larger capital, larger
profits, and concomitantly larger risks of obsolescence. Having
sunk a larger investment into capital, owners of that capital will
resist policy reform with greater effort. A systemic overpromotion
and overprotection of capital is thus creating a greater drag on
policy reform than would otherwise be the case.102
IV. THE ROLE OF LAW AND LAWMAKING IN PROMOTING AND
PROTECTING CAPITAL
What exactly is the role of law in this story of policy inertia?
The focus of this Article is on the role that law and policy play on
the antecedent conditions that give rise to an overcapitalized
economy, thereby generating policy inertia. Law and policy
create overcapitalized economies in two ways: (i) laws that
overpromote the formation of capital, and (ii) rules that
overprotect capital from changes in its legal or economic
environment.
Laws that promote the formation of capital create policy
inertia indirectly because they lower the cost of capital and induce
larger investments than would otherwise occur.103 Capital-friendly
rules thus enlarge capital stock and therefore increase the
incentives to resist reform. In short, capital-friendly rules impede
policy reform by increasing the private costs of policy reform.104
100. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 81, at 168 (noting that existing capital may pose
barriers to reform when legislators conclude that it is more economically efficient to allow
existing facilities to operate under less stringent (but environmentally harmful) standards
and take advantage of their remaining capital rather than render them obsolete).
101. See Mark R. Patterson, Product Definition, Product Information, and Market
Power: Kodak in Perspective, 73 N.C. L. REV. 185, 199 (1994) (“[E]very purchaser of a
product that requires some capital investment incurs [switching costs]. Whenever such a
product still has useful life, that remaining life will have value that will be costly to
sacrifice in switching to a different product.”).
102. Grandfather clauses “place[] the cost of the compliance burden on . . . those who
may not be aware that they will be affected, and therefore cannot combat the regulatory
enactment.” Robertson, supra note 81, at 169. This has the effect of preventing policy
reform, as “legislators may be able to enact legislation which, without the inclusion of a
protective grandfather clause, would be politically impossible.” Id.
103. See, e.g., Ellen Lapson & Richard Hunter, The Future of Fuel Diversity: Crisis or
Euphoria?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 2004, at 60, 64 (explaining how, through legislation,
Congress can “reduce risk and lower the cost of capital”).
104. See supra Part III.A (explaining how overcapitalization impedes environmental
reform).
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The latter mechanism, rules that overprotect capital,
prolong the life of capital even when environmental harms
outweigh economic benefits.105 For instance, a rule
grandfathering existing capital into older, less stringent
regulatory schemes is one example.106 Note that this latter
mechanism has a doubly pernicious effect: it entrenches existing
capital regardless of its inherent social value, and it also
produces an antecedent effect of providing assurances to new
capital investors that their capital will also be similarly protected
from unfavorable changes in legal rules.107 Investors will
overinvest knowing that legal leniencies will at least partially
insure them against obsolescence.
It is worth bearing in mind that the incentives for capital
formation can be quite small.108 All that is needed is something to
change the decision environment, not finance the undertaking. A
small subsidy can induce the formation of capital by just tilting a
close decision. It can also induce an upgrade in capital in a
situation where a more modest investment would otherwise be
privately optimal.
This Article will discuss five ways in which law and policy
overpromote the formation of capital, and overprotect obsolescent
capital: (1) tax benefits for energy industries; (2) tax benefits for
mining
industries;
(3) electric
utility
regulation;
(4) grandfathering; and (5) regulatory takings jurisprudence.
This Part will also discuss the special political application of this
theory to human and social capital.
A. Tax Benefits for Energy Industries
Clearly, federal and state governments have subsidized the
formation of energy capital through tax benefits for a long time
(by some estimates, a century).109 Equally clearly, subsidies have
105. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 81, at 168–70 (asserting that laws, such as
“grandfather clauses,” have overprotected capital at the expense of environmental harm).
106. See id. at 168 (“[Grandfather clauses] allow some existing facilities to operate
under less stringent standards.”).
107. Id. at 168–70 (describing the “perverse” effects of grandfather clauses).
108. See, e.g., Cont’l Tel. Co. of Pa. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 548 A.2d 344, 346 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1988) (recalling that merely normalizing deferred tax expenses for a utility
was designed to “provide incentives for capital formation”); see also infra Part III.B
(setting forth a simple model showing that small incentives can lead to large increases in
capital investment).
109. The expensing of intangible drilling and exploration costs for independent oil and
gas producers has been allowed since 1913. ROBERT PIROG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42374,
OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY TAX ISSUES IN THE FY2013 BUDGET PROPOSAL 3 (2012)
[hereinafter CRS REPORT], available at http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/crsr42374.pdf; see
26 U.S.C. § 263(c) (2012) (current tax code provision allowing such expensing).
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resulted in the formation of excess energy capital.110 But defining
a subsidy is tricky, especially in the energy industry, in which
there are both economies and diseconomies of scale, and
sometimes the need for a regulated monopoly. Is the regulation
and price-setting of electricity an energy subsidy? Also, certain
tax advantages inure to the benefit of many industries, of which
energy is just one;111 would that be an energy subsidy? The
definitional problems abound.
This Article will focus on subsidies that: (i) involve direct
payments from the federal government to an energy firm, (ii) reduce
or defer the tax liability for an energy firm but do not apply to
nonenergy firms, or (iii) provide some indirect but clearly financial
benefit, such as a loan guarantee. These are the types of subsidies
that are most likely to lower the cost of capital and induce excess
formation of capital.112
Some subsidies may promote the formation of capital that
confers positive externalities. For example, subsidizing the
construction of electricity transmission lines is more akin to the
provision of a public good113 that might warrant subsidization. In
such cases, it might be hard to say if the capital being formed is
“excess,” as the public-good nature of the problem suggests that
there would typically be a shortage of capital.114 Those subsidies are
generally not targeted in this Article, and in fact, are considered
below as the kind of subsidy that might be socially beneficial.
What is very much the target of this Article is the kind of
energy subsidy that seeks to simply lower the price of energy.
110. See James C. Cox & Arthur W. Wright, The Cost-Effectiveness of Federal Tax
Subsidies for Petroleum Reserves: Some Empirical Results and Their Implications, in
STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY 177, 188 (Gerard Brannon ed., 1975) (finding that special
tax provisions induced the petroleum industry to maintain larger investments in proven
reserves); Walter J. Mead, The Performance of Government in Energy Regulations, 69 AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 352, 352 (1979) (“These tax subsidies [in the form of
percentage depletion allowance and expensing of intangible drilling costs] led to increased
capital flows into exploration.”).
111. See, e.g., Philip E. Harris, The Domestic Production Activities Deduction, 12
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 101, 103 (2007) (referencing Internal Revenue Code § 199 regarding
the Domestic Production Activities Deduction, which permits a taxpayer to deduct a
percentage of their income produced through domestic production activities, regardless of
industry).
112. See Erik F. Gerding, Deregulation Pas De Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes of
Financial Institutions and the Path to Financial Crisis in Sweden and the United States,
15 NEXUS 135, 144–45 (2010) (noting that subsidies may afford lower cost of capital).
113. TOM TIETENBERG & LYNNE LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS 31 (9th ed. 2012); Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring
Consideration of the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional
Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 559 (2007).
114. See discussion infra Part V (noting the necessity of adequate electric
transmission capabilities).
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While low energy prices do stimulate economic development,
there is no reason to believe that energy would be undersupplied
absent a subsidy.115 Energy is not a public good.116
What then, are the subsidies that have led to the
formation of excess energy capital? The coal industry has long
enjoyed a privileged place in American energy policy.117 Most
coal has been combusted for electricity generation, which,
because it has predominantly been a regulated utility, has
enjoyed a special set of legal protections that have resulted in
a vastly overcapitalized industry.118 But mining coal itself is
also a privileged activity. Coal mining rights are often owned
and leased, and disposition of the coal typically results in a
royalty payment.119 For individual owners receiving royalty
payments, the royalty payments can be taxed at the lower
capital gains tax rate.120 While ordinary lease payments (such
as for residential or commercial property) must be taxed as
income,121 coal mining rights are considered a capital asset
that can be taxed at the lower rate.122 This brings marginal
coal mines into production and expands the attendant
infrastructure to extract and transport the coal.

115. See, e.g., Earl Blumenauer, Introduction, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 315, 319
(2011) (noting that, while some emerging energy technologies may benefit from subsidies,
traditional energy subsidies do not affect energy price or supply).
116. Note that this is not the same thing as making the argument that failing to
internalize environmental externalities is tantamount to a subsidy. The policy remedy of
an environmental externality is the imposition of a Pigouvian tax, not the withdrawal of a
subsidy. Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability,
63 TAX L. REV. 797, 829 (2010) (defining a Pigouvian tax as one “designed to correct
externalities”). The thrust of this Article is that certain legal institutions have created
antecedent conditions that overpromote capital and once formed, overprotect. It is
different to say that an omission such as the failure to impose a Pigouvian tax is part of
that legal infatuation with capital.
117. FREESE, supra note 23, at 130 (“In the United States, though, still in its
formative stages, coal would have an even greater impact on the political power structure
of the nation [as compared to Britain].”).
118. Peter S. Glaser, F. William Brownell & Victor E. Schwartz, Managing Coal:
How to Achieve Reasonable Risk with an Essential Resource, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 177, 186
(2011); infra Part IV.C.
119. See, e.g., Willits v. Peabody Coal Co., 332 S.W.3d 260, 261–62 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010) (involving a situation in which coal mining rights were leased with an agreement to
pay royalties upon the gross realization of the coal mined); Sam P. Burchett, The
Applicant Violator System in Transition, 21 N. KY. L. REV. 555, 559 (1994) (discussing the
structure of the lessor–lessee relationship in coal mining leases).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 631(c) (2012). Section 631 also applies to timber and iron ore. Id.
§ 631(b)–(c).
121. Id. §§ 1(c), 61(a)(3), (6), 63(a) (including royalty payments and monies from
property dealings in “gross income” and therefore in “taxable income,” which is taxed at
ordinary tax rates).
122. Id. § 631(c).
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The other fossil fuels, oil and natural gas, have also been
heavily subsidized. The Internal Revenue Code has long
granted preferential tax treatment to entities undertaking
capital projects for the exploration and extraction of oil and
natural gas.123 Independent oil and gas producers—i.e., small,
nonintegrated oil and gas producers124—are permitted to deduct
from income taxes a “percentage depletion” of their oil or gas
deposit basis rather than a cost depletion method of
accounting.125 That is, rather than try to estimate the value of
their deposit and deduct from their annual income taxes, they
may simply deduct fifteen percent of their gross income as a
generous proxy for the depreciated value of their oil and gas
deposits.126 So long as the expected life of the oil and gas well is
greater than 6.67 years (100 ÷ 15), this represents an
accelerated depreciation of their asset, and a financial benefit in
the form of a deferred tax liability.127 In addition, independent
producers are permitted to take a more generous deduction for
“intangible drilling costs,” generally defined as a cost that has
no salvage value and is “incident[al] to and necessary for the
drilling of wells and the preparation of wells for the production
of oil and gas.”128 These expenses expressly include “wages, fuel,
repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.,” that are required for the site
preparation and drilling of wells.129 Seventy percent of
intangible drilling costs are deductible from income in the year
in which they are incurred, and the remaining thirty percent
depreciated over a five-year period.130 This, too, represents a
significant benefit in the form of a deferred tax liability. Finally,
geological and geophysical exploration activities may be
depreciated over an accelerated two-year schedule, again
producing a frontloaded depreciation schedule and an effective

123. See, e.g., id. § 263(c) (allowing expensing of intangible drilling and exploration
costs for independent oil and gas producers); CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at 3 (“The
expensing of intangible drilling costs has been part of the federal tax code since 1913.”).
124. The Internal Revenue Code defines oil and gas producers as independent if,
among other requirements, they have no more than $5 million in gross receipts in a given
year. 26 U.S.C. § 613A(d)(2).
125. Id. § 613A(c)–(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (2013); CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at
5.
126. CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at 5.
127. Id.
128. 26 U.S.C. § 263(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4; CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at 1;
John S. Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 41 SW. L.J. 759, 766 (1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a)–(b).
130. CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at 3.

Do Not Delete

748

2/9/2014 4:51 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[51:3

tax liability deferral.131 These three subsidies are, according to a
2011 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration,
three of the most valuable subsidies for the oil and gas industry,
estimated by the EIA to be $980 million, $400 million, and $150
million, respectively, for 2010, for a total of about $1.53 billion.132
Over time, the subsidies appear even more generous. A
literature-based study done by a venture capital firm specializing
in energy investments estimates that from 1918 to 2009, oil and
gas firms have received $447 billion in subsidies, measured in
2010 dollars.133
It is difficult to even guess at the effect of this infusion of
money on capital formation in the energy industry, and on policy
resistance. Studies have clearly shown a higher level of
investment induced by these tax benefits.134 It is another matter
to determine exactly how much these subsidies have bloated the
capital stock. But $447 billion over 91 years—an average of $4.9
billion per year—is a lot of money to inject into even the
mammoth oil and gas industries.
It is worth remembering two things. First, because a subsidy
need only subtly nudge capital decisions, the capital-bloating
131. See id. at 6 (noting that the current law permits independent producers to
depreciate geological and geophysical costs over a period of only two years).
132. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DIRECT FINANCIAL
INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY IN FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 18 tbl.6 (2011)
[hereinafter EIA 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/
subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. It is well worth noting that estimates of the value of these
subsidies, as well as others, vary greatly. In recent budget negotiations, President Obama
proposed a budget for 2013 that would have eliminated the percentage depletion
allowance and the expensing of intangible drilling costs, and lengthened the two-year
amortization period for geological and geophysical activities. CRS REPORT, supra note
109, at 1–2 & tbl.1. The Congressional Research Service estimated the cost savings of
these changes to be $13.9 billion, $11.5 billion, and $1.4 billion, all over ten years. Id. at
5–7.
133. See NANCY PFUND & BEN HEALEY, DBL INVESTORS, WHAT WOULD JEFFERSON
DO? THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF FEDERAL SUBSIDIES IN SHAPING AMERICA’S ENERGY
FUTURE 29 (2011), available at http://i.bnet.com/blogs/dbl_energy_subsidies_paper.pdf.
134. See, e.g., Cox & Wright, supra note 110, at 188–89 (“Federal tax provisions for
petroleum have had a statistically significant effect in increasing investment in petroleum
reserves.”); Mead, supra note 110, at 352 (reporting how certain tax subsidies “led to
increased capital flows into [oil and gas] exploration”). According to the trade group Texas
Alliance of Energy Producers, President Obama’s similar proposal for fiscal year 2011 to
eliminate these four tax benefits (and some other, much less expensive ones) would have
reduced oil and gas investment by $26 billion over ten years. TEXAS ALLIANCE OF ENERGY
PRODUCERS, OIL & GAS PROVISIONS IN PRESIDENT OBAMA’S PROPOSED 2011 BUDGET (on
file with Houston Law Review). But there is no study or data to support these estimates.
Also, given the similarity of this figure with the other estimates (that of the CRS
estimates for the President’s 2013 proposal, CRS REPORT, supra note 109, and the EIA
estimates of the cost for fiscal years 2007 and 2010, EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at
18 tbl.6, these estimates are more likely just the group’s own estimates of the value of the
withdrawn subsidies, not the absolute amount of withdrawn capital investments.
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effect of a subsidy could vastly exceed the cost of the subsidy. So
$4.9 billion could well have generated excess capital in an
amount much greater than $4.9 billion. Second, the subsidy itself
is a source of funding for resistance to policy reform. If even a
small fraction of $4.9 billion were spent on litigation and
lobbying activities, the effect on public policy would have been
profound.
President Obama has repeatedly proposed to phase out or
eliminate subsidies for oil and gas companies.135 To the extent
that these subsidies stimulate the formation of capital, these are
good steps. There is in most cases nothing remotely resembling a
public good in the oil and gas industry warranting subsidization.
But the mistake that the Obama Administration makes—like all
preceding modern administrations—is to try to right a wrong by
subsidizing competing, cleaner energy sources such as renewable
energy.136 Because renewable energy does not impose the
negative environmental externalities imposed by the extraction
and combustion of fossil fuels, it would seem to stand to reason
that it is worth subsidizing their production so as to place fossil
fuels and renewable sources on a level playing field.
With an exception discussed below,137 this is mistaken
thinking. A subsidy lowers the effective cost of capital and
promotes the formation of new capital.138 The problem with
promoting capital investment in nonfossil fuel energy sources is
that it fails to learn from our past mistakes in promoting fossil
fuel energy sources. How do we know this is the “right” energy
technology? What will happen if information emerges pointing to

135. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 161–62 tbl.S-8, available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2011-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2011-BUD.pdf (showing
the budgetary plan to phase out fossil fuel tax preferences); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, at
185–86 tbl.S-8, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/
fy2012/assets/budget.pdf (same); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, at 221–22 tbl.S-9,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/
budget.pdf (same).
136. See, e.g., Paul M. Kiernan et al., International Energy and Natural Resources,
44 INT’L LAW. 367, 375–76 (2010) (discussing the Obama Administration’s support for
renewable energy); Report of the Renewable Energy and Demand-side Management
Committee, 30 ENERGY L.J. 273, 273–74 (2009) (discussing the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act of 2008, signed into law by President George W. Bush).
137. See infra Part IV.B (discussing tax benefits for the mining industry).
138. See, e.g., Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying
Housing Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835, 1847 (1988) (contending that government
subsidies lower the effective cost of capital activities, such as low income house
construction).
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alternative energy sources that are even cleaner? Promoting the
formation of capital in specific renewable energy technologies
runs the risk of locking in these technologies for longer than
would be optimal.139 Future policy reform efforts to usher in
newer and even better technologies will be met with resistance
by the owners of this capital.
Energy policies in pursuit of cleaner alternatives to fossil fuel
combustion are pursuing this misguided course. Federal energy
subsidies have increased since 2007, and although they seek to
correct a historical imbalance between fossil fuel and renewable
energy technologies,140 they repeat the historical mistake of trying
to accomplish an objective by exhorting the formation of capital.
Federal energy subsidies more than doubled from 2007 to 2010,
from almost $18 billion to more than $37 billion, and nearly all of
that increase has been due to subsidies for nonfossil energy
sources.141
In some aspects, new subsidies for renewable energy
providers are even more capital-intensive than those for oil and
gas. Producers of electricity from renewable energy sources have
long benefited from a production tax credit, a unitary subsidy for
each kilowatt-hour of electricity produced using a “qualified”
production method.142 Section 1102 of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) sweetens things, allowing
renewable energy providers to elect to take an Investment Tax
Credit instead of the production tax credit, thereby frontloading the
subsidy and immediately reducing the cost of capital, rather than
allowing for a potentially larger stream of subsidy payments.143 But
even better still, for certain renewable energy providers,144 Section
1603 of the ARRA offers a cash grant of ten or thirty percent in lieu
of the investment tax credit and the production tax credit,145 the

139. See Nina Robertson, Bruce Rich & Lynsey Gaudioso, As the World Burns: A
Critique of the World Bank Group’s Energy Strategy, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,760, 10,768
(2013) (“Every new fossil fuel investment locks in [the technology] for decades.”).
140. PFUND & HEALEY, supra note 133, at 29 (showing a substantial imbalance
among the cumulative historical subsidies for oil and gas, nuclear energy, biofuels, and
renewable energy sources).
141. EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at xi tbl.ES1.
142. 26 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
143. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 1102, 123 Stat. 115, 319–20 (as amended by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 707, 124 Stat. 3296,
3312).
144. Solar, landfill gas, trash, geothermal, wind, hydro, biomass, marine and
hydrokinetic energy sources qualify. ARRA § 1603(d)(1) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 45(d)(1)–(4),
(6)–(7), (9), (11)).
145. Id. § 1603(a)–(b).
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advantage over a tax credit being that there need not be any income
against which to offset a tax credit.146 The Section 1603 program
has been “enormously popular,” with expenditures for the grant
totaling $4.2 billion in 2010,147 and far surpassing the costs of the
production tax credit and the investment tax credit, which were
$1.5 billion and $130 million, respectively, in 2010.148 It was even
an explicit goal of ARRA to inject money into the economy to assist
in the economic recovery.149
In addition, the Department of Energy (DOE) operates
several loan guarantee programs for qualifying projects or firms.
Section 406 of the ARRA, amending Title XVII of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, provides for loan guarantees for “[r]enewable
energy systems,” “[e]lectric power transmission systems,” and
“[l]eading-edge biofuel projects.”150 By the end of 2010, DOE
had issued over $25 billion in loan guarantees.151 It was under
this program that DOE issued a loan guarantee to the failed
solar energy company, Solyndra, which brought controversy to
the program.152 Adding to the controversy, DOE is authorized
to guarantee 100% of a loan, not a more traditional fraction,
like eighty percent.153 Some funding was also issued to aid in
the construction of nuclear power plants.154 Overall, spending
on renewable energy technologies was much greater than
spending on fossil fuel technologies: more than $14 billion to
just over $4 billion.155

146. See John A. Herrick & Cara S. Elias, Federal Incentives for Clean Energy After
Solyndra: A Post-Recovery Act Precipice, 87 N.D. L. REV. 625, 678 (2011) (“By allowing
renewable energy investors to monetize the related tax credits, it has created an avenue
for investment in projects that would otherwise have been blocked during the economic
lull following the Recovery Act due to the dearth of investors with tax liability for the tax
credits to offset.”).
147. EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at 30.
148. Id. at 13 tbl.3.
149. ARRA § 3(a)(1).
150. Id. § 406.
151. EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at 59.
152. See, e.g., Hilary Kao, Beyond Solyndra: Examining the Department of Energy’s
Loan Guarantee Program, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 475–78 (2013)
(describing the controversy surrounding the loan guarantee program after “Solyndra
experienced financial difficulties despite having received the DOE loan guarantee
commitment”); Ashley Southall, House Passes Solyndra Act Aimed at Obama, CAUCUS
(Sept. 14, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/house-passessolyndra-act-aimed-at-obama/?ref=solyndra&_r=0.
153. See EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at 64 (explaining that, initially, DOE
could guarantee a more traditional eighty percent of a loan, but by the time the final
rulemaking was passed, DOE was authorized to guarantee the full amount).
154. See id. (describing how, with the passage of the Fiscal Year 2008 Appropriations
Act, DOE was authorized to allocate $18.5 billion in loan guarantees to nuclear plants).
155. Id. at xiii tbl.ES2.
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The goal of trying to rapidly ramp up renewable energy
production is certainly laudable, especially in the face of an
inability to pass comprehensive climate legislation that might
achieve an energy transition in a more holistic way.156 It is still
troubling, however, to consider how much capital is being formed,
with relatively little known about the relative merits of wind
energy as opposed to other technologies that may emerge in the
next several years. From 2000 to 2010, net generation of
electricity from wind power rose from 6 billion kilowatt-hours to
95 billion,157 and net summer capacity for wind energy grew from
just about 8 gigawatts in 2005 to over 39 gigawatts in 2010.158
This is troubling because the technology of electricity production
is constantly evolving. Only recently did Congress suddenly
notice the potential of hydrokinetic energy, the use of wave action
to generate electricity.159 Only recently has low-tech solar
thermal energy gained attention,160 as it has become competitive
much more quickly than the previously favored solar technology,
photovoltaics.161 If a new and better renewable energy
technology is discovered, what will be the policy response of
wind energy developers that have invested billions of dollars?
As I have argued elsewhere, the correct response to the
environmental externality of emissions from fossil fuel-fired
sources is not to try to subsidize all that is not fossil fuels.162 If
there is a negative environmental externality, the right
approach is to tax the negative externality, not to subsidize
everything else. It seems politically more palatable to
156. Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the
Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 296 (2011) (“Congress has failed to pass
major climate change legislation . . . .”).
157. EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at xx tbl.ES5.
158. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL
2010, at 6 tbl.1.1B (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/table1.
1b.cfm.
159. FERC Issues First Pilot License for Tidal Power Project in New York, FED.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2012/2012-1/0123-12.asp (last updated Jan. 23, 2012) (illustrating that hydrokinetic projects are a recent
endeavor); Hydrokinetic Projects, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/hydrokinetics.asp (last updated Jan. 22, 2014).
160. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 158, at 6 tbl.1.1.B (showing a steady
increase in net capacity of solar thermal energy from 2000 to 2010); S. Mekhilef, R. Saidur
& A. Safari, A Review on Solar Energy Use in Industries, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY REVIEWS 1777, 1778–79 (2011), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S1364032110004533# (“Due to the global energy shortage and
controlling harmful environmental impacts, application of solar energy has [been]
receiving much attention in the engineering sciences.”).
161. HSU, supra note 7, at 43.
162. See id. at 36–37 (“Government subsidization should be viewed with skepticism,
rather than being the presumptive first option.”).
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subsidize “good” industries than it is to tax “bad” industries,163
but the politically expedient approach is less efficient.164 In the
context of energy policy, a much more effective and efficient
policy tool than subsidization is a carbon tax.165 Among other
problems with the pushing-on-a-string effectiveness of trying
to prop up all that is putatively good,166 subsidizing “good”
industries promotes the excessive formation of capital. A tax
on a negative environmental externality is capital neutral.167
Capital formed in one industry (e.g., wind energy) because
negative externalities are taxed in another industry (coal, oil,
or natural gas) will not be as likely to become obsolete because
it is responding to a technology-neutral price signal, not a
political judgment.
B. Tax Benefits for Mining Industries
There is one industry that may benefit from even greater
taxpayer generosity than the energy sector: the hard rock
mining industry. Few industries create as many or as severe
environmental externalities as the mining industry.168 But
apparently following in the same industrial-development, lowcommodity-price rationales that animate energy subsidies, a
variety of favorable tax provisions facilitate the formation of
163. See id. at 118–23 (“[P]ublic opinion polls seem to show that the American public
strongly favors subsidy programs to reduce greenhouse gases but strongly opposes carbon
taxes or gasoline taxes . . . .”).
164. See id. at 53–59 (critiquing the United States’ track record with respect to
making “strategic decisions” and commenting how it is “too easy and too dangerous to fall
into the trap of thinking that governments can ‘fix’ the problem directly, funding a
potential ‘home run’ or ‘gamechanger’”); see also MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOWCARBON ECONOMY 73 (2009), available at www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/
client_service/sustainability/cost curve pdfs/pathways_lowcarbon_economy_version2.ashx
(illustrating how the use of subsidies can cause waste).
165. See HSU, supra note 7, at 34–37 (comparing the effects of taxing carbon versus
subsidizing renewable energy); MCKINSEY & CO, supra note 164, at 19, 73 (suggesting
that a carbon tax would help reduce emissions and discussing the negative externalities of
subsidies).
166. See HSU, supra note 7, at 34–37 (expressing some limitations of subsidization).
167. See id. at 45 (labeling a carbon tax as “capital-neutral” because it “does not
encourage the formation of expensive physical capital that would inhibit future changes
in production”).
168. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T
PROGRAM, UNIVERSAL OWNERSHIP: WHY ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES MATTER TO
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 27 fig.3 (2011), available at http://www.unpri.org/files/
uop_long_report.pdf (listing “Industrial Metals & Mining” as the third-highest industry
sector in terms of environmental costs); Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the U.S., U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/
environment/emissions/ghg_report/ghg_methane.cfm (“Natural gas systems and coal
mines are the major sources of methane emissions in the energy sector.” (citation
omitted)).
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mining capital. Exploration and development expenses for
mining companies, unlike for oil and gas companies, are
deductible in full in the year those expenses are incurred.169
The deduction is required to be recaptured when the mine goes
into production, but many miners are able to avoid this taxable
event by avoiding “production” status.170
In Canada, where mining is a centrally important
industry,171 small, start-up mining companies, known as
“juniors,” can pass through capital losses—losses that cannot
be deducted from their income because juniors have no
income—up to acquiring companies.172 The advantage of
having this benefit of “flow-through” shares is that a tax
deduction is essentially sold from an entity that has no income
against which to deduct expenses, to a larger entity that does.
Thus, the tax benefit is commodified and made into a valuable
asset, creating a premium for shares of juniors and stripping
away significant risk in an inherently risky business. From
1987 to 1991, $2.5 billion (CAD) of flow-through shares were
exchanged, accounting for sixty percent of the funding for
mining exploration over that period.173 Empirical research
suggests that this has led to capital overinvestment in the
mining industry and below-market returns to mining
capital.174 It was the stated policy of the Canadian government
that the flow-through share device should promote equity
investments in mining and petroleum companies in Canada,
and it should provide financing assistance to junior,

169. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 617(a)(1) (2012), with 26 U.S.C. § 461(i)(2), and 26 U.S.C.
§ 263(a), (c).
170. Treas. Reg. § 1.617-3 (2013).
171. Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction together represented eight
percent of the Canadian economy, and roughly twenty-seven percent of the Canadian
goods-producing economy in 2012. Canadian Industry Statistics: Gross Domestic Product
(GDP): Canadian Economy (NAICS 11-91), INDUS. CAN., http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cissic.nsf/eng/h_00013.html#vla2b (last updated Dec. 18, 2013).
172. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-1 §§ 40(1)(b), 44.1(8)(b), 110.6(2.1)(d) (Can.
5th Supp.); KPMG IN CANADA, KPMG, A GUIDE TO CANADIAN MINING TAXATION 7, 12
(Sept. 2011), http://www.kpmg.com/Ca/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docu
ments/5539_KPMG_A%20Guide%20to%20Canadian%20Mining%20Taxation_web.pdf; see
also Christopher Berry, How to Blow Up a Start Up—The Biggest Financing Pitfall for
Entrepreneurs, FORBES (July 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/discoveryinvesting/
2012/07/16/how-to-blow-up-a-start-up-the-biggest-financing-pitfall-for-entrepreneurs-2/
(discussing how small start-up mining companies are known as juniors and “generate no
cash flow, revenue, or earnings”).
173. Gordon J. Lenjosek, A Canadian Tax Incentive for Equity Investments in Mining
and Energy Companies, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EVALUATION, Fall 1998, at 117, 120.
174. See id. at 127 (reporting that “overheating” in the mining industry caused
incremental drilling activity to be lower than incremental mining exploration spending).
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nontaxpaying, companies.175 It has apparently succeeded in
this respect.176
The extraction of valuable deposits has obviously been vital
in developing the economies of wealthy countries.177 These
sectors are particularly capital-intensive and foundational in that
their abundance seems to be a predicate to economic growth, so
perhaps they are particularly tempting targets for subsidization.
But this is precisely the superficial and specious growth
paradigm that retards policy reform. It is unnecessary, and
indeed potentially very harmful, for government policy to actively
stimulate economic growth by promoting the formation of capital.
The energy and hard rock mining industries stand as prominent
examples of this bias.
C. Electric Utility Regulation
The law is perhaps no more obsessed with capital in any
other area than it is in the area of regulated electric utilities.
Regulated electric utilities are only permitted by their regulators
to charge ratepayers in accordance with the general formula
R = O + B• r
where R is the total allowed revenues (to be divided up
among ratepayers), O is the allowed operating expenses, B is the
company’s “rate base,” all those capital assets from which the
company is permitted to earn a return, and r is the permitted
rate of return.178 Given this regulatory structure, it is in the
company’s interest to acquire more capital and expand the rate
base as much as possible in order to maximize their permitted
revenues. This bias is commonly known as the “Averch–Johnson
effect.”179 Although additions to the company’s rate base must be
175. Id. at 119.
176. See id. at 125 (“[F]low-through shares raised a substantial amount of equity-based
financing for exploration and development[,] . . . were the dominant means by which funding
was raised for mining exploration[,] resulted in significant incremental spending on mining
and petroleum exploration and significant incremental exploration drilling activity[,] . . . and
assisted non-taxpaying junior exploration companies.”).
177. See MINING, MINERALS & SUSTAINABLE DEV. PROJECT, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV.,
BREAKING NEW GROUND 172 (2002), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G00900.pdf (“Many of the world’s
richest countries have benefited greatly from minerals extraction. Australia, Canada, Finland,
Sweden, and the United States, for example, have all had extensive minerals industries and
used them as a platform for broad-based industrial development.”).
178. FRED BOSSELMAN, JIM ROSSI & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, ENERGY, ECONOMICS,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 507 (2000) (describing the formula).
179. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052–53 (1962).
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“prudently incurred,”180 and must be “used and useful,”181 the
reality is that the company often has the upper hand in a
ratemaking setting in which it seeks to justify its expenditures to
a regulator.182 Empirical evidence for the Averch–Johnson effect
is not unambiguous, but generally supportive.183
Courts and commissions hearing ratemaking cases do not,
however, seem overly concerned about the Averch–Johnson
effect. In In re Limerick Nuclear Generating Station, the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission addressed the question
of whether a project may be included in the utility’s rate base if
the project was prudent at the time of commencement but had
subsequently become unnecessary.184 The opinion, one of only a
few that actually considered and discussed the Averch–Johnson

180. Duquesne Light Co. v Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989) (“Under the prudent
investment rule, the utility is compensated for all prudent investments at their actual
cost when made (their “historical” cost), irrespective of whether individual investments
are deemed necessary or beneficial in hindsight.”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944) (discussing the Natural Gas Act’s requirement that all
natural gas rates be just and reasonable); Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Phila. Elec. Co., 31
P.U.R.4th 15, 29 (Pa. P.U.C. 1978) (entering judgment against a utilities company
because of expenditures “which would not have been made had prudent management
been exercised”); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 548, 592, 617 (1969) (describing the basic workings of the regulatory process).
181. Barasch, 488 U.S. at 303–04; Bill Clinton et al., FERC, State Regulators, and
Public Utilities: A Tilted Balance?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 1987, at 11, 11, 43
(describing the “used and useful” requirement).
182. For a discussion of the administrative law surrounding ratemaking cases, see
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall
of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 13, 15 (2004), and Jim Rossi, The
Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 379, 383, 391, 393 (2009). In In re Limerick Nuclear Generating Station, the
Pennsylvania Utilities Commission, in evaluating expert testimony on a variety of
technical and economic matters, wrote:
In performing our analysis, we are cognizant of the fact that many of the
calculations and figures presented in the context of this proceeding are
somewhat speculative. Although no one can perfectly see the future, we are
convinced that those estimates represent more than educated guesswork on the
part of the witnesses.
In re Limerick Nuclear Generating Station, 48 P.U.R.4th 190, 192 (Pa. P.U.C. 1982);
see also Posner, supra note 180, at 617 (showing that, in practice, the regulatory
agencies do not have as much power over ratemaking as they do in theory).
183. See, e.g., Léon Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility
Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 53, 70 (1974) (confirming the Averch–Johnson
proposition of inefficiency); H. Craig Peterson, An Empirical Test of Regulatory Effects, 6
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 111, 112, 119, 124 (1975) (providing empirical evidence to
support the Averch–Johnson proposition); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return Regulation
and Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test of the Averch–Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 38, 49–50 (1974) (demonstrating the soundness of the Averch–
Johnson proposition through a trans-log production function).
184. In re Limerick Nuclear Generating Station, 48 P.U.R.4th, at 200–01.
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effect, minimized its import.185 The Commission’s glib dismissal
of the Averch–Johnson effect reveals the bias of ratemaking
bodies:
We could better spend our time focusing on whether undue
and unnecessary financial constraints are leading us
toward a future of insufficient electricity supply and the
attendant problems of unnecessarily high electricity prices,
unnecessarily high oil consumption, and reduced economic
growth. These questions transcend the close-in arguments
on [construction work in progress] that turn on relatively
technical points of consumer discount rates and impacts on
cost of capital.186
This treatment seems to acknowledge that the Averch–
Johnson effect is a valid theoretical consideration, but not of any
practical importance, at least relative to other considerations.
That is regrettable, and it highlights how disinclined
policymakers and lawmakers are to critically consider the true
usefulness of hard and familiar capital. Utility commissions, it
would seem, are still more concerned with low electricity prices
and are willing to allow the construction of more capital to
ensure them.187
Electric utility regulation also presents the most compelling
illustration of how an industry will fight to maintain a privileged
position: rent-preserving through resisting policy reform. The
catchphrase “stranded costs” was born in the wake of widespread
state efforts to deregulate electricity generation and liberalize
energy markets.188 Liberalization means loss of monopoly power,
and incumbent electricity generation firms in states trending
towards deregulation complained loudly about the costs of power
plants that had not yet been recouped from ratepayers.189
Estimates of the amount of money believed to be at stake in the
185. Id. at 211–12 (“Averch–Johnson phenomenon—This concept, developed in the
early 1960s, maintains that the utilities will invariably seek to overbuild their systems.
The financial disincentive of not allowing [construction work in progress] in the rate base
is seen as counteracting this tendency. . . . The Averch–Johnson phenomenon is no longer
applicable—Even if it did apply in the early 1960s, there is little current credibility to the
[Averch–Johnson] phenomenon given the current depressed financial condition of the
industry.”).
186. Id. at 212.
187. Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding
California’s Restructuring Disaster, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2002, at 191, 192, 195
(illustrating this concern and its effects on the state of California).
188. Id. at 191, 193–94.
189. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, Regulation, Competition, and
Liberalization, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 325, 329–30 (2006); Timothy J. Brennan & James
Boyd, Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts, 11 J.
REG. ECON. 41, 42, 44–46, 50 (1997).
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mid-1990s, the height of deregulation speculation, ranged from
$34 billion to $210 billion.190 As explained in this Article,191 the
expected stream of benefits could well be greater than the value
of the capital stock. The specter of deregulation, which would
have disadvantaged incumbent electricity generators, was
enough for the industry to embark upon a massive campaign for
compensation.192
The campaigns surrounding electricity deregulation are
complicated because electricity deregulation itself is complicated.
States have traditionally regulated vertically integrated utilities,
and as such, have had primary jurisdiction over electricity
generation, transmission, distribution, and marketing.193
However, not only does the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) regulate the interstate transmission of
electricity,194 but the federal government has from time to time
played a prominent role in setting electricity policy, such as when
Congress passed the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(requiring utilities to buy power from cogeneration sources and
from renewable energy sources)195 and the 1992 Energy Policy
Act, amended in 2005 (which required FERC to order the opening
of interstate transmission lines to independent generators),196
and when FERC actually issued the order to unbundle electricity
services197 and open up interstate transmission lines under Order
888 (which also mandated other requirements of utilities and

190. Eric Hirst & Lester Baxter, How Stranded Will Electric Utilities Be?, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Feb. 15, 1995, at 30, 31.
191. See supra Part III.B.
192. Reed W. Cearley & Daniel H. Cole, Stranded Benefits Versus Stranded Costs in
Utility Deregulation, in 7 THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: THE END OF A
NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY 169, 170–72, 179, 181–82, 184–85 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds.,
2003).
193. Robert J. Michaels, Electricity and Its Regulation, LIBRARY ECON. & LIBERTY
(2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ElectricityandItsRegulation.html.
194. What
FERC
Does,
FED.
ENERGY
REGULATORY
COMM’N,
https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last updated May 28, 2013).
195. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 92 Stat.
3117, 3144 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012)).
196. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721–722, 106 Stat. 2776,
2915–20 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j–824k); Bob Eleff, Federal Regulation of
Electric Transmission: From Monopolistic Barrier to Competitive Force, RESEARCH DEP’T,
MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.house.leg.state.
mn.us/hrd/pubs/regelectric.pdf.
197. “Unbundling” means to break up the traditionally vertically integrated electric
utilities typical of the regulated monopoly regime. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, California’s
Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 365, 367 (2001) (distinguishing between
“wholesale” and “unbundled” transmission service).

Do Not Delete

2014]

2/9/2014 4:51 PM

CAPITAL RIGIDITIES

759

transmission owners).198 Lobbying and lawsuits thus took place
on both the state and federal levels.
The unusual characteristic of the electricity deregulation
debate was that almost all of the parties, from integrated electric
utilities, to consumer groups, to rural electric cooperatives,
agreed: electricity deregulation could work, if done properly
(their way).199 The disagreement was which path would be taken.
Electric utilities spent $5.4 million in 1992 campaign
contributions, which increased to $9.5 million in 1996.200 Interest
groups self-reported a conservatively estimated total of
$50 million in contributions.201 The end result is a mixed bag:
fifteen states, plus Washington, D.C., either fully deregulated or
actively regulated their electricity markets, and seven have
suspended their deregulation plans,202 including California,
which suffered the most humiliating failures of deregulation.203
As of 2010, the remaining states were not in the process of
deregulating electricity at all.204
Granted, electricity deregulation is complicated business,
challenging the capacity of elected legislatures to comprehend.
But given the consensus among interest groups that electricity
deregulation is a good thing (as long as they get their way), the
stalled nature of electricity deregulation serves as a testament to
the power of incumbency. If there is any doubt as to the power of
the electricity generation industry to get its way, more evidence
can be found in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009, also known as Waxman–Markey after its House
sponsors.205 Waxman–Markey, which passed the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2009, would have instituted a greenhouse gas

198. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (2013).
199. Electricity Deregulation, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/issues/
electricity/index.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATUS OF ELECTRICITY
RESTRUCTURING BY STATE (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/
page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html.
203. California electricity consumers suffered high prices and brownouts when
electricity suppliers accumulated market power through failures of the deregulation plan
and chose to withhold power in times of electricity shortages. See, e.g, Joskow, supra note
197, at 377–78, 384; Peter Navarro, On the Political Economy of Electricity Deregulation—
California Style, ELECTRICITY J., March 2004, at 47, 47–49, 53 (commenting on the
“California electricity crisis” and the mistakes leading up to it).
204. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 202.
205. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009); HSU, supra note 7, at 120 (discussing how the Waxman-Markey Act “provided the
disadvantaged coal industries and the utilities that burn coal with enormous payoffs in
the form of free allowances”).
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cap-and-trade program, allocating permits to emit greenhouse
gases, at least initially, by simply writing the allocations into the
bill.206 The largest recipient of freely allocated emissions permits?
Electric utilities would have received 43.75% of the freely
allocated allowances for 2012 and 2013, declining gradually to
7% by 2029.207 It was no surprise that the bill had the support of
the Edison Electric Institute, the trade association for electric
utilities, because it was deeply involved in writing it.208
D. Grandfathering
Grandfathering, or more generally “transition relief,” is a
common practice in lawmaking, especially in environmental
lawmaking.209 Because environmental regulation can severely affect
the value of capital, environmental laws have often exempted
existing capital from new laws or regulations.210 Lawmakers seem
particularly worried about negative impacts on capital.211
The normative discussion on grandfathering has been
largely efficiency-oriented, centering on a discussion of how to

206. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, § 727.
207. Id. § 782(a).
208. EEI president Thomas Kuhn also made a number of post-passage efforts to
support a Senate bill that would be compatible with the Waxman–Markey bill he helped
craft. HSU, supra note 7, at 120 (illustrating the Edison Electric Institute’s partnership in
crafting the bill); John M. Broder, Senate Gets a Climate and Energy Bill, Modified by a
Gulf Spill That Still Grows, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A18 (“The leader of the main
utility industry trade group, Thomas R. Kuhn of the Edison Electric Institute, stood with
Mr. Kerry and Mr. Lieberman on Wednesday and endorsed their bill.”).
209. Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 91, 92, 96 (2011) (noting that the distinction between new sources of pollution and
existing sources “reflects a recurring political problem faced by makers of environmental
policy”); Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to
Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 811 (2009) (“[T]he government
may choose to base allocations not on current activities, but on recent activities that
predate the announced intention to implement limitations on resource access. Such
systems have become increasingly common in the context of environmental and natural
resource regulation.”); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and
Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1677, 1680 (2007) (“The problem of whether and how to extend favorable treatment
to existing sources is a recurring one in environmental law.”); Robert N. Stavins, VintageDifferentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 29, 34 (2006)
(“[G]randfathering is likely to be a politically expedient option for legislators, since it
allows leeway in rewarding firms and in distributing the costs and benefits of regulation
among jurisdictions.”).
210. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 152, 157–58 (noting that environmental laws
often contain grandfathering clauses which exempt existing capital from new
regulations).
211. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 209, at 127 (“Both state and federal lawmakers have
shied away from imposing the enormous costs associated with the mandatory retrofit,
upgrade, or retirement of in-use diesel trucks . . . .”).
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allocate the “costs of legal transitions.”212 Louis Kaplow’s seminal
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions argued against
grandfathering on the grounds that legal transitions are not
sufficiently different from other changes in the economic
environment to warrant different treatment.213 One might argue
that in legal changes, as in market changes, it is the private
party that is better able to anticipate change.214 The more
compelling arguments, however, point out how a regime of
grandfathering creates perverse incentives.215 There is obviously
the transition relief itself, which could become the subject of rentseeking.216 Also, regulatory targets might, in anticipation of
transition relief, have less incentive to anticipate very
foreseeable legal changes, for example, as a result of emerging
public health or safety concerns.217 Additionally, in regimes in
which transition relief might be pegged to historical baselines,
just a whiff of new regulation may send regulatory targets off in
a race to boost their baselines in the hopes of securing a larger
share of the impending transition relief.218 And finally,
policymakers have utterly failed to appreciate that grandfather
status confers an asset in the form of a legal exemption, which
competitors, but not incumbents, have to observe.219 This can be
an enormous advantage, and a barrier to entry, as new entrants
are required to spend hundreds of millions that incumbents do
212. See id. at 92 (suggesting that economists believe the crux of transition policy is
efficiency); see also DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 221–23 (2000) (positing that delay is
superior to grandfathering for transition relief); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 512, 584–87 (1986) (analyzing the undesirability
of grandfathering).
213. Kaplow, supra note 212, at 513, 581–82 (1986) (“As an initial hypothesis,
government transitions warrant the same treatment as market transitions: no transition
relief.”).
214. See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1657, 1662–65 (1999) (explaining the incentive private parties have to anticipate changes
in the law).
215. See Maria Damon et al., Grandfathering 8, 10 (Ind. Univ. Sch. Pub. & Envtl.
Affairs, Research Paper No. 2012-11-03, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2182573 (commenting on how grandfathering can “reduce economic efficiency
and social welfare”).
216. Levmore, supra note 214, at 1681–82, 1698.
217. Nash & Revesz, supra note 209, at 1725.
218. See Nash, supra note 209, at 820, 822, 836–37 (discussing the negative impact
that “first possession” can have on resources); see also Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen,
Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799,
806–10 (1997) (describing how the fishing industry has responded to and evaded tight
regulations).
219. Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 71, 73–75 (2008) (illustrating how grandfather status allows for
noncompliance with the regulation).
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not.220 This has the ironic effect of slowing capital turnover
because abandoning the capital also means abandoning the
valuable asset (grandfather status), thereby delaying the
achievement of air quality benefits.221
A number of arguments have been offered in favor of
transition relief, but none are as general as the arguments
against it. Expensive, iterative technologically-based pollution
control mandates may warrant some transition relief.222 But the
context in which transition relief is discussed is not often of such
a clumsy command-and-control sort.223 It could also be that
awarding transition relief is a second-best outcome, inferior to a
policy change unaccompanied by transition relief, but better than
the status quo.224 But government’s inability to ascertain the
private costs and call a bluff is an invitation to rent-seeking that
may swamp any potential private palliative benefits.225 Finally, it
has been argued that regulatory bodies, not capital investors, are
in a better position to anticipate new regulation.226 But to the
extent that new regulation is meant to address changing market
conditions and emergent harms of some product or process, it
would seem to be capital investors, not regulatory bodies, that
are likely to have superior information.227 It is their capital, after
all, and in the first instance it would be capital investors
undertaking the due diligence of vetting the soundness of their

220. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 160–61, 167–69.
221. See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 81, at 10,096 (discussing grandfathering’s drag on
capital turnover); John A. List, Daniel L. Millimet & W. Warren McHone, The Unintended
Disincentive in the Clean Air Act, 4 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, no. 2, 2004, at 1,
13–14 (finding “deleterious effects on plant-level modification decisions”); Randy A.
Nelson, Tom Tietenberg & Michael R. Donihue, Differential Environmental Regulation:
Effects on Electric Utility Capital Turnover and Emissions, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 368,
369, 371, 373 (1993).
222. See Shavell, supra note 219, at 71–73 (discussing benefits and concerns of
grandfathering as transition relief).
223. See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627, 638–
39, 641, 645 (suggesting that command-and-control regulation is responsible in large part
for regulatory failure in the United States); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional
Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 273, 297–300 (1996)
(reasoning that command-and-control regulation can often be dysfunctional).
224. See Levmore, supra note 214, at 1665–66 (suggesting that to achieve policy
change, a norm must be developed); Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The
Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 400–01 (2010)
(explaining under what conditions transition relief may be superior to the status quo).
225. See Levmore, supra note 214, at 1666–68 (sharing a pessimistic view of
transition relief).
226. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of Unbounded Commitments to Regulate
Risk, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 135, 137, 139 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996)
(demonstrating why regulatory bodies are better inclined to anticipate changes).
227. Levmore, supra note 214, at 1657, 1659 & n.5, 1675, 1680.
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investment. For example, there is no reason to believe that the
Environmental Protection Agency would have any advantage in
anticipating the environmental risks of hydraulic fracturing than
the oil and gas companies that engage in it.
But all of these arguments speak to behavior after the
formation of capital. The less obvious but possibly greater
distortion is the ex ante effect that an expectation of
grandfathering has on capital investment decisions. A
substantial part of the risk of new capital is the risk of
premature obsolescence due to regulatory action, the emergence
of superior alternatives, or some other unexpected shock.228
Absent risk, there is no reason that investors would abstain from
supersizing their capital investments. Insuring, even partially,
against the risk of obsolescence by regulation biases investors
towards larger capital investments. And all other things being
equal, larger capital investments will inspire larger efforts to
defend them.229
It is thus not so much that grandfathering inhibits policy
change because it delays compliance with updated standards of
behavior (a common complaint from environmentalists);230 it is
that grandfathering inhibits policy change because it emboldens
capital investors. Armed with the knowledge that legislatures
and agencies will only reluctantly impose new costs, capital
investors will, from a societal point of view, overinvest. Moreover,
the more expensive the capital, the more reluctant lawmakers
will be to regulate it.231
So common is the provision of at least some transition
relief232 that regulatory targets cannot help but notice and feel at

228. See David Gabel, Divestiture, Spin-Offs, and Technological Change in the
Telecommunications Industry—A Property Rights Analysis, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 95–
96 (1990) (discussing premature obsolescence in the telecommunications industry).
229. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale of investing,
absent risk).
230. See, e.g., NRDC: Regulating Obesogens, ONEARTH (June 27, 2011),
http://www.onearth.org/article/nrdc-regulating-obesogens (“When TSCA was first passed,
over 60,000 chemicals were ‘grandfathered’ in, with no requirement for toxicity
information to continue their production. . . . While rates of diseases linked to chemical
exposures continue to rise, the federal system that is supposed to be protecting us is
unable to do the job and millions of people are at risk.”); see also Natural Res. Def. Council
v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“NRDC attacks several elements of the
grandfathering as too generous . . . .”).
231. See Huber, supra note 209, at 127 (describing how “direct and indirect
compliance costs associated with regulatory objectives affect their structure and
implementation”).
232. See Damon et al., supra note 215, at 4–5 (commenting on how grandfather
clauses serve as exemptions from regulatory requirements and may or may not be limited
to a certain period of time).
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least partially insured against changes in legal rules that might
jeopardize their capital.233 The provision of transition relief has
been elevated to almost norm status.234 Capital investors have
come to expect a right to extract some profits out of their capital,
regardless of its inherent usefulness, and regardless of the social
harms it will impose, foreseeable or not. Transition relief, based
on a misguided intuition, has made the obsolescence of capital
everybody’s problem. Everybody, that is, except the owners of
obsolescent capital.
E. Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
If there were a legal development that would exemplify the
misguided bias in favor of capital, it would be the rise in
regulatory takings jurisprudence. For approximately the last
thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has been extremely
interested in scrutinizing land use regulations to see if they are
so onerous as to constitute a regulatory taking of property
triggering a Fifth Amendment requirement of compensation.235
The effects of this doctrinal lurch toward property rights
protection are not obvious. But more than any other legal or
policy phenomenon, it reveals the one-sidedness with which laws
and legal institutions (most prominently the Supreme Court)
have come to view capital.
Justice Brennan’s three-factor analysis in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,236 still the default test for
what constitutes a regulatory taking requiring the payment of
compensation,237 prominently includes consideration of “the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct

233. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 209, at 1726 (“[W]hen the government enacts a
new legal regime with transition relief, it sends a signal to society at large that, in
general, changes in legal standards will not govern existing actors.”).
234. See Huber, supra note 209, at 98, 112 (“[F]ull grandfathering is the norm in
land use regulation.”); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal
Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 215 (2003) (noting the “legislative norm of
applying legislative changes nominally prospectively”).
235. See Joseph L. Sax, Land Use Regulation: Time to Think About Fairness, 50 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 455, 457 (2010) (“[D]uring the FDR era, the Court became more
sympathetic to regulation, only to shift again starting around 1980. In recent decades, the
more conservative majority on the Supreme Court has shown that the Court is, again,
quite sympathetic to the constitutional claims of property owners.”).
236. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The three
factors are: the character of the government action, the economic impact upon the
claimant, and the interference with investment-backed expectations. Id.
237. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (“[R]egulatory takings
challenges are governed by the standards set forth in [Penn Central].”); see also Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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investment-backed expectations.”238 Although the jurisprudence
and the literature do not explicitly say so, investment-backed
expectation interests are what judges think are the interests in a
stream of benefits stemming from the exploitation of capital. In
the numerous regulatory takings cases that followed Penn
Central, it is obvious the extent to which courts have paid careful
attention to what owners of capital expect.239 It is less obvious
that courts seem to have lost sight of the social welfare of
regulation attacked by regulatory takings litigation.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, perhaps the
most prominent beachhead for property rights advocates, the
Court squarely focused itself on the impacts on the petitioning
landowner, finding that a South Carolina statute, in blocking
development of a residential lot on a barrier island otherwise
crowded with houses, effectively deprived a land developer of
“economically viable use of the land.”240 Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion stated that,
[A]t the time Lucas acquired these parcels, he was not
legally obliged to obtain a permit from the Council in
advance of any development activity. His intention with
respect to the lots was to do what the owners of the
immediately adjacent parcels had already done: erect
single-family residences. He commissioned architectural
drawings for this purpose.241
Quite explicitly, Justice Scalia’s opinion, as do the vast
majority of regulatory takings cases, places the regulatory
takings focus on the effects of regulation on the landowner.242
Very little is said anymore about the common law police power
that has served as the general regulatory authority for state and
local governments for decades.243
238. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
239. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 535
U.S. 302, 352 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the extent to which the duration of
a moratorium interferes with the economically beneficial use of the land); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–27 (2001) (finding that regulations existing at the time of
purchase are not the sole determiner of investment-backed expectations and can be
challenged); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532 (1998) (holding that a requirement to
make retroactive contributions to a fund for coal mine workers suffering from black lung
disease frustrated petitioner’s investment-backed expectations).
240. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–09, 1016, 1031–32 (1992).
241. Id. at 1008 (emphasis added).
242. See id. at 1008–09, 1027–31 (highlighting how the Beachfront Management Act
disturbed the petitioner’s property rights); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535
U.S. at 306, 320–24; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124–25, 136–38.
243. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 471, 472 (2004) (“The term ‘police power’ . . . has been ignored in contemporary
takings jurisprudence.”).
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In Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, one of the largest
egg producers in the United States challenged an emergency
order by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to slaughter all of
the chickens in three of Rose Acre’s large chicken egg farms and
to clean and sanitize the hen houses, following a series of
salmonella outbreaks that were all traced to the three farms.244
Rose Acre was still allowed to sell the eggs in liquid form.245 Rose
Acre still sued, claiming that its diminished profits constituted a
regulatory taking.246 Astonishingly, the Court of Federal Claims
agreed, ruling that the emergency health order did in fact
unconstitutionally take Rose Acre’s property, awarding Rose Acre
over $6 million in damages.247 Applying the Penn Central test,
the court held that the order interfered with Rose Acre’s
investment-backed expectations,248 that the economic impact
upon Rose Acre was severe,249 and that the character of the
government action impermissibly favored the government.250 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, but
left intact the lower court’s application of the investment-backed
expectations part of the test.251 Even as the court cautiously
upheld an emergency public health measure to prevent the
recurrence of a harm traceable to the petitioner’s farms that had
already sickened hundreds of people,252 the court let stand the
hopelessly one-sided part of the lower court’s opinion regarding
the effect on petitioner’s capital.253
One could argue (many have) that property law in particular
has gotten carried away with thinking about rights and
neglecting correlative duties.254 The Supreme Court has certainly

244. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 643, 646–52 (2003), rev’d,
559 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 935 (2010).
245. Id. at 647 & n.1, 648.
246. Id. at 653.
247. Id. at 670.
248. Id. at 659.
249. Id. at 658.
250. Id. at 659–60.
251. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1265–66, 1275–76,
1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
252. Id. at 1262–64; Brief for the United States in Opposition at 2, Rose Acre Farms,
Inc. v. United States, 559 U.S. 935 (2010) (No. 09-342) (reporting 3,300 cases of
salmonella during a 1986 outbreak).
253. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 559 F.3d at 1265–66, 1283.
254. See Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and the Takings of Property:
Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 313–14 (2006)
(suggesting an alternative model of property that “starts from the idea that owners have
obligations as well as rights”); Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the
Scalian View of Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 729, 731–32, 752 (2004)
(discussing how “property claims are so often . . . unavoidably reciprocal in character” and
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done its part to tilt the inquiry in that direction. When the Court
has addressed the harm-prevention goals of a land use
restriction, it has scrutinized the restrictions and their
effectiveness, taking a skeptical view of the assertions of the land
use regulatory agencies.255 It is striking that regulatory takings
law so consciously focuses on the welfare of capital, and not social
welfare. Courts have been willing to expand the regulatory
takings inquiry into a number of areas beyond land use
regulation,
including water,256 offshore oil
leasing,257
258
governmental contractual rights, and intellectual property.259
Electric utilities, facing losses due to new competition arising
from deregulation260 have even raised regulatory takings claims
from de-regulation.261 At bottom, regulatory takings law has
sought to protect the expectation interests of owners of capital.262
This deference to capital owners on the one hand, and skepticism
towards the regulator and the social harm on the other, is
analogous to the one-sidedness with which we view the benefits
and the costs of capital. The law, as we do, only seems to
cause courts to arbitrarily balance “reciprocal evils[] done by reciprocal actors” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
255. In Lucas, Justice Scalia, critical of Justice Blackmun’s reliance on the common
law police power to permit harm-preventing land use restrictions, writes that
In Justice Blackmun’s view, even with respect to regulations that deprive an
owner of all developmental or economically beneficial land uses, the test for
required compensation is whether the legislature has recited a harm-preventing
justification for its action. Since such a justification can be formulated in
practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a
stupid staff.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
256. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 508–09, 519, 521–22
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that a reduction in a water allocation under a state statute could
be a regulatory taking if the allocation was reduced to fulfill trust obligations to Native
Americans and to comply with the Endangered Species Act); Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 313–14, 319 (2001) (holding that reducing
water deliveries to comply with the Endangered Species Act was a physical taking).
257. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 746, 751 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that the suspension of offshore oil drilling operations after a 1969 oil spill off the southern
California coast, pending an environmental review, was a taking).
258. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(holding that a water contract right-holder could assert a regulatory takings claim for
breach).
259. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that
intellectual property rights can be rights that can be the subject of a regulatory taking).
260. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the financial effect of deregulation on
incumbent electricity generation firms).
261. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1435, 1457 (2000) (explaining that utilities companies have made takings claims
due to so-called “stranded costs” resulting from deregulation).
262. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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appreciate the benefits of capital formation, and not so much the
costs.
All that said, a consensus seems to exist that the changes in
regulatory takings law have been modest.263 Regulatory takings
jurisprudence over the last thirty years has not remade the legal
landscape for land use regulation or for regulation generally.264
Regulatory takings law is not exhibit A for this Article’s thesis
that capital-friendly law has created an overcapitalized economy.
Rather, what the last three decades of regulatory takings law
seem to show is how legal thinking reflects a desire to protect
capital to the detriment of less tangible, more diffuse but
potentially
much
more
important
social,
economic,
environmental, and public health interests. Moreover, Justices
Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito, the four justices most
inclined to uphold private property rights against governmental
interference, may not be done.265 Regulatory takings
jurisprudence may still yet solidify a legal bias for entrenching
capital.
F. The Politics of Human and Social Capital
All of these laws and regulations confer some preferential, or
at least special status on physical capital. But what about social
and human capital? It is less obvious, but potentially more
important, that law, regulations, government policy, and even
private firms have inclinations to protect human and social
capital. While laws do not explicitly or structurally favor human
or social capital the way they privilege physical capital, it is clear
that political institutions bias decisions towards preserving
human and social capital.266 The pervasiveness of grandfathering
is one example. Behind the desire to preserve physical capital lies
the connected desire to preserve the jobs, know-how, and social
networks that derive from operation of physical capital.
263. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 235, at 467 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence is undeveloped and unhelpful as applied to general
issues of unfairness).
264. See id. at 458 (noting that since the 1980s, the Supreme Court “has failed to
provide clear guidance in regulatory takings cases”).
265. See, e.g., Garrett Power, Property Rights, the “Gang of Four” & the Fifth Vote:
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection
(U.S. Supreme Court 2010), 21 WIDENER L.J. 627, 634, 644–45 (2012) (arguing that the
four justices inclined to uphold property rights are still casting for a fifth vote to overrule
Penn Central).
266. See, e.g., GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 56, at 198 (discussing how state laws that
governed school districts’ fiscal responsibilities played a prominent role in increasing
enrollment in schools by providing poorer school districts with grants to build schools and
supplement teacher salaries).
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Unlike physical capital, human and social capital are most
ardently supported in the legislative branch. For communities,
businesses, and industries that are heavily dependent upon their
human and social capital, and for whom alternative existences
seem remote and implausible, reform represents an existential
threat to the owners of that capital. Elections in coal mining
communities, for example, become single-issue elections, with
coal jobs taking center stage.267 In the 2012 election cycle,
campaigns in coal country states such as Virginia, Kentucky, and
Pennsylvania focused heavily on coal, drawing a number of
Democrats into the coal camp.268 In West Virginia, where
President Obama is viscerally hated for his perceived hostility to
coal,269 the President was outpolled in several large counties in
the state’s Democratic primary by a convicted felon, still
incarcerated in Texas.270
Fortunately for coal-mining communities in West Virginia,
they had the luck of being represented by former Senate majority
leader Robert Byrd.271 In a five-decade-long career in the Senate,
Byrd regularly championed coal-mining communities, regularly
foiling air pollution regulation efforts:
267. See, e.g., Bruce Schreiner, Grimes Defends Coal, Touts Jobs Plan for Kentucky,
MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 16, 2014), available at www.miamiherald.com/2014/01/16/3875793/
grimes-defends-coal-touts-jobs.html (“Coal mining, a major industry in Kentucky, has
emerged as a central issue in the Senate race.”); Jennifer Yachnin, Republicans Talk Up
Coal, Keystone XL as Economic Themes Take Center Stage, GREENWIRE (Aug. 29, 2012),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059969329/print (“Republican candidate Andy
Barr [argued that] [t]his year alone, 2,000 Kentucky miners lost their jobs because of
overregulation and Obama’s war on coal. For every mining job lost, three additional jobs
are threatened.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
268. Roger Alford, Chandler, Barr Spar Over Economy, Jobs, ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2012),
available at http://www.state-journal.com/local%20news/2012/10/30/chandler-barr-sparover-economy-jobs (noting coal’s importance to Kentucky candidates in the 2012 U.S.
Senate race); Josh Kurtz, 2 Democrats in Close Races Profess Strong Support for Coal in
New TV Ads, E&E NEWS PM (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/
stories/1059969935/print (“In Virginia, former Gov. Tim Kaine (D), who is locked in a
tight open-seat race against former Sen. George Allen (R), launched an ad today in which
he touts the help his administration gave a coal plant in southwest Virginia when he was
governor. . . . ‘This state-of-the-art coal plant in southwest Virginia, where my wife’s from,
created 2,500 new jobs,’ Kaine says. . . . Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania’s 12th
District . . . Rep. Mark Critz (D) began airing an ad . . . that blisters the Obama
administration for its environmental regulations. ‘Seven hundred coal jobs depended on
building an air shaft at the Cumberland Mine,’ Critz says . . . ‘[b]ut we had to fight
President Obama’s EPA to get it built.’”).
269. Manuel Quinones, Appalachia Fights Back Against President’s Coal Policies,
ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY (May 10, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059964186/print
(referencing Obama’s low popularity ratings in West Virginia due to his “agenda to
tighten pollution controls”).
270. Id.
271. Adam Clymer, A Pillar of the Senate, a Champion for His State, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2010, at A1.
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Arguments have been made that costs and dislocations
caused by the compliance requirements of this legislation
pale in comparison to the public health benefits. But what
will we really have accomplished if we succeed in removing
certain pollutants from the air and at the same time level
the economies of whole communities and regions? Is that
progress? Is that kind of devastation not even to be
considered here? . . . When mines are shut down, not only
do miners and their families suffer but whole communities
also suffer.272

What is it about coal mine workers and their communities that
make them so invested in a livelihood so fraught with danger and
disease?273 Granted, culture, identity, and personal pride are at
work. But part of the answer must also be that there is embedded
but unpriced capital in coal mining. This not only includes the
physical equipment for coal mining operations, but also potentially
more importantly, a tremendous amount of social and human
capital wrapped up in coal mining and its ancillary businesses.
By no means is coal mining special among resource
industries. Rural communities in many resource exploitation
industries have found political champions that have sought to
protect the social fabric around which their economic and
social lives are bound. Logging communities found an ally in
the late U.S. Senator Slade Gorton:
That preservation law has wreaked incomprehensible
havoc on timber families who have had to live with
prolonged uncertainty about their futures. All indices of
human despair have gone through the roof in these
communities: child abuse, spousal abuse, alcohol and
substance abuse, divorce, adolescent depression and
suicide attempts, bankruptcies, and illness. All of these
have been exacerbated by the terrible and unintended
consequences of the Endangered Species Act of 1973.274

272. 136 CONG. REC. 796–97 (1990) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd).
273.
DIV. OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE STUDIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PUB. NO. 94-120, WORK-RELATED LUNG DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REPORT 30 tbl.3-1
(1994), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/94-120/pdfs/94-120.pdf (identifying coal
mining as occupation on death certificate in sixty-nine percent of pneumoconiosis-related
deaths between 1985 and 1990); NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 201-172, COAL MINE DUST EXPOSURES AND
ASSOCIATED HEALTH OUTCOMES: A REVIEW OF INFORMATION PUBLISHED SINCE 1995, at
19 figs.14–15 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2011-172/pdfs/2011172.pdf (showing age-adjusted death rates, years of potential life lost before age sixty-five,
and mean years of potential life lost (per million) for decedents age twenty-five years or
older in the United States between 1968 and 2006 with coal workers’ pneumoconiosis as
the underlying cause of death).
274. 138 CONG. REC. 31,856 (1992) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton).
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And in the environmentally-minded state of Massachusetts,
the uniformly Democratic congressional delegation has
consistently and vigorously fought fishing limitations set by the
National Marine Fisheries Service under the Sustainable
Fisheries Act.275 Iconic liberal Congressman Barney Frank, who
held a ninety-two percent favorability rating from the League of
Conservation Voters when he retired in 2012,276 has often led the
charge. In a 2009 letter to National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) Administrator Jane Lubchenco, Frank
urged Dr. Lubchenco that the NOAA “must be willing to act on
its own to ensure decisive and immediate action to implement
revised regulations necessary to protect fishermen and fishing
communities from unnecessary and often devastating financial
hardship.”277 Several months later, after apparently receiving
little mollification from Lubchenco, Frank called for her
resignation, putatively over agency misconduct.278 Massachusetts
Attorney General Martha Coakley, in suing NOAA last year for
setting tight fishing limits, complained of a “callous disregard for
the well-being of New England fishermen,” that will lead to the
“extinction of an industry that for more than a century has been
a part of the commercial and social fabric of New England.”279
What these statements exemplify is a rhetorical focus on
jobs, families, and communities. In the vernacular of this Article,
they represent human capital and social capital, and in rural,
resource-based economies, they represent capital in groups where
capital is otherwise scarce. When human and social capital are
the only assets belonging to an individual or a group, a threat to
that capital sets up a particularly acute public choice problem—
the interests of capital owners are extremely and intensely

275. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1884 (2012); Shawn Zeller, Fish Fight: The Massachusetts
Congressional Delegation Is Usually in Sync with Environmentalists, but Not on Fishing
Limits, COMMONWEALTH (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/
Departments/Washington-Notebook/2011/Spring/Fish-fight.aspx (“[T]he Massachusetts
representatives insist that it’s they who are in the right, defending an ancient way of life
against rules that they believe will drive small fishermen out of business.”).
276. National Environmental Scorecard: Representative Barney Frank (D), LEAGUE
OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, http://scorecard.lcv.org/moc/barney-frank (last visited Feb. 11,
2014).
277. Letter from Barney Frank, Rep., U.S. House of Representatives, to Dr. Jane
Lubchenco, Adm’r, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Oct.
26, 2009), available at http://www.savingseafood.org/images/documents/congress/10_26_
09_lubchenco_frank.pdf.
278. Matt Viser, Frank, Tierney Call on NOAA Chief’s Dismissal, BOS. GLOBE (July
8, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2010/07/frank_calls_on.
html.
279. Petition for Judicial Review at 1–2, 6, Massachusetts v. Blank, 1-13-cv-11301
(D. Mass. 2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2013/1-13-cv-11301.pdf.
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concentrated, as opposed to those that would benefit from
environmental protection. This dependence on continued
exploitation of capital can generate psychological effects that defy
objective facts. Desperate owners of threatened capital will
zealously reject notions that their practices and their capital
have become harmful or anachronistic.280
V. WHITHER, CAPITAL? A REFOCUS ON PUBLIC GOODS
It is important to emphasize what this Article is not arguing.
This Article is not arguing that the formation of capital should
never be promoted or subsidized or that capital should never be
protected. Public goods,281 after all, are often capital goods, and
this Article is certainly not arguing that we should abandon
direct government provision or funding of national defense,
schools, parks, law enforcement, and a judiciary, all of which are
capital goods within the working definition set out in this
paper.282
The conceptual difficulty is that public goods are rarely “pure,”
in that they are perfectly nonexcludable and perfectly
nonrivalrous.283 The question for government provision or funding
of a given project then, is how “pure” of a public good is the project?
There are certainly capital goods that are not purely public goods
but may be quasi-public goods, and sufficiently possess public good
characteristics as to warrant subsidization. Network goods, such as
railroad lines, roads and highways, and ports all have at least some
degree of public funding, direct or indirect.284

280. See, e.g., Kimberly Morrison, Fishing Industry Fights Red Snapper Regulations,
JACKSONVILLE
BUS.
J.,
http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2009/06/01/
story5.html (last updated May 28, 2009) (discussing a situation where fishermen strongly
opposed federal regulation of red snapper fishing even though an assessment showed the
snapper were being overfished at “nine times the sustainable level”).
281. Public goods are nonexcludable (meaning that once they are provided, people cannot
be excluded from enjoying them), and nonrivalous (meaning that consumption by one
individual does not detract from consumption by another). See ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL &
RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION
METHOD 1 n.1 (1989); RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES,
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8–9 (2d ed. 1996).
282. See supra Part II (defining capital as “a long-lived asset that generates a stream of
benefits” (emphasis omitted)).
283. See MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 281, at 1 n.1 (“Pure public goods are
characterized by the conditions of non-excludability of and non-rivalry congestion between
individuals who wish to use the good . . . . In the real world, few public goods meet these strict
conditions . . . .”).
284.
See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, IMPROVING THE
NATION’S FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SPECIAL PANEL ON 21ST CENTURY FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION 15, 31, 37 53 (2013)
(discussing federal funding programs for highways, harbors, airports, and railroads).
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But one reason that legal institutions have gotten into the
bad habit of overpromoting capital is that some capital projects
have looked enough like public goods to warrant subsidization.
Certain capital projects hold the promise of conferring new
positive externalities so as to apparently justify government
funding or some other legal mechanism to promote its
development. So how can meritorious public good-like projects be
distinguished from the ordinary capital projects which require no
public support and are simply part of the overcapitalization
problem?
One type of misguided motivation for promoting capital is an
apparent desire for low commodity prices. Driving energy prices
down and keeping them low appears to have been a central part
of American industrial policy.285 An original justification for
subsidies was to stimulate capital investment in the oil and gas
industries, once considered undercapitalized and immature.286
Favorable tax rules incentivized exploration and production by
reducing capital costs and uncertainty,287 an effort that has been
spectacularly successful.288 Capital investment in these sectors is
considerably higher than private investment alone would have
achieved.289 But well past the point at which the oil and gas
industries in the United States could be considered immature,
and past the point at which firms were unable to diversify risks
of failure, the subsidies persisted.290 Once the old justifications

285. See Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax
Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 43, 67 (2006); see also Reforming Energy Subsidies: Summary Note, IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/subsidies/pdf/note.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2014)
(explaining how subsidies are meant to maintain low prices for consumers); Yuki Noguchi,
Solyndra Highlights Long History of Energy Subsidies, NPR (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/16/142364037/solyndra-highlights-long-history-of-energysubsidies (describing the long history of subsidies, beginning in 1918, for the American oil
and gas industry).
286. Hymel, supra note 285, at 47.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 64–65 (“The federal government’s huge investment in the petroleum
industry . . . influenced how quickly and dramatically the United States developed into a
fossil fuel-driven society.”); Mead, supra note 110, at 352 (“[T]ax subsidies led to increased
capital flows into exploration . . . and production was stimulated. . . . [I]ncreased
production led to lower oil prices and established the historic U.S. low-price policy for
energy.”).
289. See Cox & Wright, supra note 110, at 188–89 (demonstrating how special tax
provisions have increased investment in petroleum reserves); Mead, supra note 110, at
352 (“[T]ax subsidies led to increased capital flows into exploration.”); supra text
accompanying notes 132–33 (discussing the staggering oil and gas subsidies that spurred
this capital investment).
290. Hymel, supra note 285, at 47–48 (stating that the tax subsidies persisted even
when it was clear that the nation’s increasing demand for oil showed no signs of slowing).
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became implausible, new justifications emerged: (i) that national
security demanded an expansion of supply to reduce dependence
upon unstable foreign regimes,291 and (ii) the maintenance of low
consumer prices.292 Such ex post rationalization of continued
subsidies is a hallmark of an overcapitalized industry addicted to
government support.
Promoting the formation of capital to maintain low
commodity prices is mistaken thinking because low commodity
prices are not a public good.293 It is true that low energy prices
spur all kinds of economic activity that might not have occurred
without them.294 In that sense, capital producing low energy
prices produces substantial positive externalities. But as the last
half-century of energy development has demonstrated,
subsidizing fossil fuels is not the only way to produce low energy
prices. But because of huge amounts of entrenched capital in the
fossil fuel industries, change has been slow coming.295
This pattern of initial government subsidization, followed by
large capital inflows into a targeted sector, followed by a
stubborn resistance to subsidy reform, repeats itself in a number
of resource sectors. Agricultural subsidies in the United States
have not only distorted markets, but they also contributed to the
capital intensification of agriculture.296 Fisheries subsidies have
created a larger fleet of larger fishing boats, exacerbating an
overcapitalization problem and creating a persistent overfishing
problem.297 Unsurprisingly, reform in these and other capital-

291. Id. at 68, 70.
292. Id. at 47–48.
293. See supra note 281 (defining “public goods”).
294. See, e.g., Hymel, supra note 285, at 67 (illustrating how low energy prices often
encourage petroleum consumption rather than conservation); David M. Smolin, The
Paradox of the Future in Contemporary Energy Policy: A Human Rights Analysis, 40
CUMB. L. REV. 135, 172 (2009) (“Conventional energy policy seeks to facilitate an adequate
supply of energy at a low price in order to facilitate economic activity and growth.”).
295. Hymel, supra note 285, at 67 (discussing how increased profitability in the
petroleum industry “increased investments in petroleum exploration” but “inhibited the
development of alternatives to fossil fuels”); see also supra Part III.A.
296. SUZANNE IUDICELLO, MICHAEL WEBER & ROBERT WIELAND, FISH, MARKETS, AND
FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING 60 (1999) (“[T]he key feature of subsidy
policies is that they distort the way markets operate . . . .”); William S. Eubanks II, A
Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our
Nation’s Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 214–15 (2009) (arguing that the United
States Farm Bill “encourages overproduction, trade distortion, and depression of world
market prices”).
297. IUDICELLO, WEBER & WIELAND, supra note 296, at 60–63 (explaining how
subsidies have led to overexploitation of marine life by encouraging the use of “technology
that increases the capacity to exploit natural resources” and creating “oversized fishing
fleets and . . . overfishing”).
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heavy sectors has been virtually impossible.298 And worthy of
note, it has not necessarily been the absolute size of the costs of
government support that is of such great importance to the
capital-owning resource users; it is the relative importance of
their capital in their otherwise capital-poor environments that
motivate them to strongly resist reform.299
Public policy toward the formation and protection of capital
must clearly be refocused. The allure of low commodity prices,
resource sector development, and economic development
generally has detracted from what should be the focus of
government provision and subsidization: public goods. Conceding
that distinguishing public goods or quasi-public goods from
ordinary capital projects is difficult, I propose one guiding
principle: public goods or quasi-public goods are often network
goods. Roads and highways, railroad lines, telephone and
telecommunications networks, fiber optic cables, and the Internet
itself are all network goods.300 These goods have (or have had) the
potential to dramatically expand commerce, by providing new
means of transportation or communication. Network goods do not
merely confer positive consumption externalities301 or merely
embody complementarity with other goods,302 but rather provide
either electronic or physical linkages among users or among
nodes.303 Networks embody some public good aspects in that
there are large economies of scale involved, with marginal costs

298. Id. at 65, 70 (“Despite their lack of economic soundness and the demonstrable
damage they have done to both fish populations and fishing fleets, subsidies . . . persist in
the face of criticism. . . . Efforts to remove subsidies face tremendous political
opposition . . . .”); Michael Pollan, You Are What You Grow, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 22,
2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/magazine/22wwlnlede.t.html?
pagewanted=all (noting that the current farm subsidy structure has been in place for the
last few decades).
299. See supra Part III.B (discussing how capital owners will fight vigorously to
protect their hoped-for stream of benefits generated by their human or social capital).
300. For a general description of network “industries,” see LAWRENCE J. WHITE, U.S.
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD NETWORK INDUSTRIES 5–8 (1999), which describes network
industries and distinguishes between one-way and two-way networks, and Shmuel S.
Oren & Stephen A. Smith, Critical Mass and Tariff Structure in Electronic
Communications Markets, 12 BELL. J. ECON. 467, 467 (1981), which explains why a
network can be considered a “public good.”
301. A positive consumption externality is the positive effect of additional
consumption by others. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
302. See WHITE, supra note 300, at 2 (commenting on how “network industry” has
“become an expansive, all-inclusive phrase that appears to embrace almost any composite
good or service embodying complementary components”).
303. Id. (suggesting that in some network industries “there are physical or electronic
linkages that create networks”).
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declining steeply with consumption.304 Networks are also
characterized by at least some degree of nonexcludability or some
degree of nonrivalrous consumption.305
I emphasize the support of network capital because the
connectivity created by networks has the potential to deliver the
kind of outsized economic benefits delivered by public goods. The
opening up of channels of commerce is perhaps the most
fundamental economic function of government.306 Commercefacilitating networks produce the greatest gains when they lower
the transaction costs of meeting and exchanging for persons and
entities that otherwise have no previous relationship and are in
that sense “unorganized.”307 Such a network must hold out the
promise of a fruitful exchange, so access and cost are important.
Carol Rose, in writing about the role of navigable waterways in
promoting commerce, has characterized such spaces as
“inherently public” space,308 where the costs of utilization are so
low that spontaneous, unorganized commerce can take place.
Water-based commerce represents a vital stage in the economic
development of almost every modern society.309 Similarly, the
provision of railroads, roads, highways, and the Internet each
delivered, in their own time, a crucial connectivity that opened
up entirely new sets of possible transactions, and produced
previously unimaginable gains from trading.310

304. Id. at 8–9; Michael Hsu, An Introduction to the Pricing of Electric Power
Transmission, 6 UTIL. POL’Y 257, 257–58 (1997).
305. See MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 281, at 1 n.1. (stating that few public goods
fully exemplify the nonexcludability and nonrivalry traits); see, e.g., Brett Frischmann,
Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market
Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market, COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV., June 2001, at 1, 25–26 (noting that the Internet is nonexcludable and
only “sometimes rivalrous”).
306. See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 770 (1986) (discussing “[t]he great
commerce clause” and positing that “[t]hrough ever-expanding commerce, the nation
becomes ever-wealthier”).
307. Id. at 720–21, 765 (commenting on the role of navigable waterways in promoting
commerce).
308. Id. at 720–21, 772–73 (characterizing “inherently public property” as “fully
controlled by neither government nor private agents”).
309. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 284, at 27
(“Moving people and goods over water is arguably the oldest form of transportation in
human history. For millennia, civilizations have depended upon ships to move goods to
support nations and economies.”).
310. Id. at 11–13 (illustrating, for example, how a simple tee-shirt ordered in the
United States from overseas moves by truck and ocean vessel or aircraft before arriving in
the United States and being sent to the customer by freight or truck). Just as an example,
agricultural advances occurred with the expansion of crop varieties, which was made
possible by the expansion of the railroad network. GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 56, at 265.
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In the energy realm, there is one capital network worth
promoting: electricity transmission lines. The traditional
electricity paradigm of base-load power plants belonging to a
vertically integrated utility, operating as a regulated monopoly
with exclusive access to a customer base, is gradually giving
way to a deregulated, decentralized paradigm which would, in
theory, include a variety of ways for electricity supply to meet
demand.311 A deregulated and decentralized electricity supply
system would include the entry of new energy sources, demand
reduction and conservation measures, and pricing schemes
aimed at smoothing consumption patterns, thereby reducing
daily peak demands.312 Crucial in a shift to a new electricity
paradigm is the opening up of electricity markets to new
entrants, and the introduction of competition for electricity
consumers. Indeed, publicly-funded networks such as roads,
highways, and rail lines have benefited fossil fuel industries
enormously by lowering the costs of transporting fossil fuels, a
benefit that continues to afford fossil fuels an advantage over
renewable energy sources.313 To do this, a network of
transmission lines that was designed to deliver base-load
power to captive consumers must be technologically and
economically transformed.314 Care must be taken to ensure
that network goods are instruments of competition,315 as they
would if transmission lines reduce the cost of delivering
electricity and make possible a greater variety of electricity
generation sources, such as wind energy.316 Among energy

311. Cearley & Cole, supra note 192, at 170.
312. See, e.g., id. at 170, 175–76; Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson,
Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1811 (2012) (discussing the challenges of wind power).
313. Alexandra B. Klass, Tax Benefits, Property Rights, and Mandates: Considering
the Future of Government Support for Renewable Energy 28 (Univ. Minn. Law Sch.,
Research Paper No. 13-11, Feb. 22, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=222298
(explaining how the fossil fuel industry has access to a complex level of infrastructure,
such as pipelines, that is not available to other forms of energy like solar or wind energy).
314. See, e.g., Klass & Wilson, supra note 312, at 1811–12 (explaining why an
expansion of the transmission grid will be critical in order to increase the utilization of
wind resources). For a review of the complicated issues surrounding a revamping of the
electric grid, see PJM, A SURVEY OF TRANSMISSION COST ALLOCATION ISSUES, METHODS,
AND PRACTICES 3 (2010), available at http://ftp.pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/
20100310-transmission-allocation-cost-web.ashx.
315. Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell & Steven Stoft, The Competitive Effects of
Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry, 31 RAND J. ECON. 294, 295–
98 (2000).
316. Wind energy is generally abundant where people are not, such that the most
important barrier to entry for wind energy producers is access to electricity customers
through the transmission grid. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY
2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 93–100
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experts, energy stakeholders, and even among partisan
politicians, there is broad agreement that the U.S. electricity
transmission network dramatically needs upgrading.317
Transmission lines have many public good aspects. Regional
transmission organizations, or RTOs, which are charged with
operating most of the transmission capacity in the United States,
have become regulated utilities.318 By requiring broad access to
both electricity consumers and suppliers, which the 2005 Energy
Policy Act requires of RTOs,319 transmission lines are mandated
to assume at least one public good characteristic:
nonexcludability. Thus, the development of a cost allocation
mechanism, another thorny problem for the development of a
transmission policy,320 becomes necessary in order for RTOs to
remain economically viable.
Distinguishing capital projects worth promoting from those
not worth promoting is territory ripe for imprecision, to be sure.
However, some guidance on capital investments is surely better
than the indiscriminate, all-capital-is-good mindset embodied in
existing law and policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article is the beginning of an exploration of the role of
physical, human, and social capital in perpetuating inefficient
behavior long after it is recognized as obsolete. If capital is
acquired for a very specific purpose and cannot be redeployed for
(2008), available at http://www.20percentwind.org/20percent_wind_energy_report_revOct
08.pdf.
317. ENERGY SECURITY ANALYSIS, INC., MEETING U.S. TRANSMISSION NEEDS 19
(2005), available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/ElectricityTransmission/Documents/
meeting_trans_needs.pdf; ERIC HIRST, U.S. TRANSMISSION CAPACITY: PRESENT STATUS
AND
FUTURE PROSPECTS 25 (2004), available at http://www.gc.doe.gov/sites/
prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/transmission_capacity.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
NATIONAL
TRANSMISSION
GRID
STUDY
5–7
(2002),
available
at
http://certs.lbl.gov/ntgs/main-screen.pdf; Eric J. Lerner, What’s Wrong with the Electric
Grid?, INDUSTRIAL PHYSICIST, Oct./Nov. 2003, at 8, 8.
318. See 16 U.S.C. § 796(27) (2012) (defining “RTO” for purposes of regulatory
statutes).
319. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, §§ 1231, 1291, 119 Stat. 594, 955,
984. North America’s electricity grid has been devolved to ten “regional transmission
organizations,” which are regulated by FERC and are mandated to play the regulated role
of an electricity transmission network. See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS MAP (2012), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/
electric/indus-act/rto/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf.
320. Hung-Po Chao & Stephen Peck, A Market Mechanism for Electric Power
Transmission, 10 J. REG. ECON. 25, 26, 31, 39–40 (1996); William W. Hogan, Contract
Networks for Electric Power Transmission, 4 J. REG. ECON. 211, 214–15 (1992) (describing
the challenges of a cost–benefit analysis when a grid is used by many relatively small
market participants).
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another purpose, then any shift in production methods could
effectively “strand” that capital and render it worthless.
Especially for mass-produced goods, such as electricity, the cost
of capital is large relative to the units in which the benefits flow
back to the owner of capital. Payback of capital is accomplished
over long time horizons, and over broad populations. When
production is undertaken with methods that involve high capital
costs and a stream of benefits that are small and widespread—
and therefore involve a long payback—a stable pricing and
regulatory environment becomes extremely important. A small
change in the pricing environment amplified over its application
to a large number of customers and transactions results in a
potentially huge change. In such an environment, owners of
capital can be forgiven for being a bit paranoid and obsessive
about protecting their capital by protecting their economic and
regulatory environment.
This Article argues that legal rules have helped capital
owners control their economic and regulatory environment to the
detriment of a broader society. Misguided policy and legal
preferences have crept into legal rules and have not only
promoted the formation of new capital, but they also protected
existing capital from regulatory interference. The problem is thus
not just that government has become an insurer against
obsolescence; it is that these legal rules insuring capital against
obsolescence have biased the mix of capital towards obsolescenceprone capital. The result is a self-reinforcing inefficiency that
grows over time, exacerbating latent environmental problems
and making them harder to address.
This analysis takes public choice theory into new territory. A
theory of capital introduces a new variable not previously
considered carefully. The prominence of physical, human, and
social capital requires explicit treatment of actors at the
individual, firm or sub-industry levels, so as to identify incentive
structures at a disaggregated scale. This theory of capital is an
exposition of exactly what path-dependency means in the context
of industry, firm, and individual behavior. A theory of capital is a
form of institutional analysis applied to the choice sets facing
industries, firms, and individuals that engage in harmful or
inefficient behavior.

